

Good News for Troubled Contexts: Lessons learned from case studies on how civil society organisations influence policy processes

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Introduction

Since 2004 ODI has embarked in a research-action process to understand the challenges civil society organisations (CSOs) in developing countries face to influence pro-poor policy processes using research based evidence. The objective of this broader initiative is to develop, in consensus with our partners in developing countries, a strategy to support and promote a more systematic use of evidence in policymaking. This particular project has aimed to collect case studies of CSOs attempting to influence policy processes as a means of learning about the challenges that they face and the strategies they follow to overcome them. The lessons learned from these cases can provide excellent examples of the existing practical knowledge of policy influencing strategies held by development researchers and practitioners in developing countries. Hopefully, this study will help systematise these lessons offering CSOs practical recommendations for action.

This short paper explores the experiences of CSOs attempting to inform and influence policy processes in developing countries. The paper uses examples from a series of short case studies commissioned by the ODI during 2005 as part of a Call for Case Studies launched by the Civil Society Partnerships Programme (CSPP).² Throughout the consultation workshops organised by ODI and its partners in 15 developing countries, participants expressed their frustration at attempting to influence complex policy processes. For many CSOs, policy influence constitutes a part of their work that remains prohibitive to their capacities and resources stocks.

It is our opinion, however, that although many contexts are in fact extremely complex and unfriendly and that CSOs are crippled by resource and capacity constraints, there are many things that they can do to be successful in informing and inspiring those policy processes. This paper addresses some of these good news case studies. Its objective is to highlight what can be done and what is possible; even in troubled contexts.

Method

A total of 18 full case studies have been commissioned and received so far; but the paper also considers lessons from some of the proposals sent to the ODI as well as those case studies that are in the process of completion. We have attempted to capture as many different experiences of success and failure as possible by targeting different regions and sectors.

The cases have been prepared by researchers or practitioners (all of them from or living in developing countries). In most cases, they had been personally or through their institutions involved in the processes followed by the CSOs that the cases describe. This is important to note because it means that the cases and proposals presented have a natural bias to success stories as well as to the attribution of change to the CSOs own work. In the analysis, we have given this a great deal of attention and have tried to discuss the real contribution to change of the same actors.

² <http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/projects/ppa0104>

The cases were written in a process that included a constant discussion between my self and the authors. This helped define the key questions and refine the answers to highlight lessons and shortcomings of the preferred strategies (often absent from first drafts). Although time consuming, we at ODI believe that this method has yielded positive results; including the development of some research and writing skills among the authors. Most importantly, the process helped address some of the biases mentioned above.

The proposals were discussed with ODI staff and considered according to the following criteria:³

- Do they address a clear policy change?
- Do they consider the use of evidence?
- Is there a clear role for CSOs?

The cases were then chosen to keep a balanced regional and sectoral representation. However, in some cases, the cases were chosen to compare between initiatives from the same country and sector:

Table 1: Full case studies used in this report

	Author	Country	Sector
1	Elphas Ojiambo	Kenya	Cashew nuts
2	Peter Orawo	Kenya	Energy
3	Xufeng Zhu	China	Constitutional
4	Zahid Shahab	Pakistan	Youth
5	Anil Bhattarai	Nepal	Natural resources
6	Sudeep Jana	Nepal	Natural resources
7	Natalia Dimitrova	Bulgaria	Anti-corruption
8	Oswaldo Molina	Peru	Environment
9	Jorge Mora	Costa Rica	Water
10	Monica Barroso	Brazil	Education
11	Mahesh Sarma	India	Pollution
12	Emmanuel Nkurunziza	Uganda	Land-reform
13	Suckhobjon Ismoilov	Uzbekistan	Domestic violence
14	Michelle Harris	Jamaica	Environment
15	Ermal Hasimja	Albania	Citizen safety
16	Ane Roemer-Mahler	South Africa	Environment
17	Richard Valenzuela	Philippines	Domestic workers
18	Fabein Lefrancois	Global	World Commission on Dams

³ The cases that were not accepted fall into at least one of the following categories: i) they were written by researchers from developed countries, ii) they were unclear about the policy change to be analysed, iii) they were unclear about the evidence used, iv) they were unclear about the actual strategies followed by CSOs, v) they were not sufficiently well written. Still, the proposals provide interesting examples that, when used in conjunction to the finished cases, can support us with useful lessons.

Note: Two-page hand-outs of the case studies are available in the annexes


This synthesis uses these accounts to illustrate the different types of policy contexts and external influences that CSOs have to face; the existence of and roles played by the links and networks between them; and the importance of research based evidence in the policy process. The paper highlights some good practices as examples of the types of strategies that can be followed to increase the chances of informing and influencing pro-poor policy processes.

Before addressing the lessons from the case studies, it is relevant to understand the lens through which these have been analysed by their authors. The RAPID framework is described in the following section.

The RAPID Framework

Traditionally, the link between research and policy has been viewed as a linear process, whereby a set of research findings is shifted from the 'research sphere' over to the 'policy sphere', and then has some impact on policy-makers' decisions. However, we now know that policy processes are not linear; that there are multiple entry-points for research which can in turn be affected by policy; and that the production of research can itself occur within the policy context.

Figure 1: The RAPID Framework: Context, Evidence and Links



Literature on the research-policy link has a more dynamic and complex view that emphasises a two-way process between research and policy, shaped by multiple relations and reservoirs of knowledge (for example, see: Garrett and Islam 1998; RAWOO 2001). This shift reflects the fact that this subject area has generated greater interest in the past few years, and already a number of overviews of the research-policy

linkage exist.⁴

The RAPID framework is shown in Figure 1, above. This framework should be seen as a generic, perhaps ideal, model. In many cases, there will not be much overlap between the different spheres, or the overlap may vary considerably. The case studies were developed using it as an analytical framework.

Political Context

The research/policy link is shaped by the political context. The policy process and the production of research are in themselves political processes, from the initial agenda-setting exercise through to the final negotiation involved in implementation. Political contestation, institutional pressures and vested interests matter greatly. So too, the attitudes and incentives among officials, their room for manoeuvre, local history, and power relations greatly influence policy implementation (Kingdon 1984; Clay and Schaffer 1984). In some cases the political strategies and power relations are obvious, and are tied to specific institutional pressures; but in other cases these respond more to hidden agendas and processes. In any case, it is hence possible that seemingly good ideas may be discarded by the majority of staff in an organisation if those ideas elicit disapproval from the leadership. Previous ODI work has indicated that this arena is the most important (Court and Young 2003; Court, Hovland and Young 2004). While contextual factors can be the most difficult to change, small changes can often have major impacts (Gladwell 2000).

Evidence

Experience and previous work done by ODI suggests that the nature of the research and the way that it is communicated can be as, if not more, important than its quality for policy uptake. Policy influence is affected by both topical relevance and, equally importantly, the operational usefulness of an idea; hence it helps if a new approach has been piloted and the document can clearly demonstrate the value of a new option (Court and Young 2003). The other key set of issues here concern communication. The sources and conveyors of information, the way new messages are packaged (especially if they are couched in familiar terms) and targeted can all make a big difference in how the evidence is perceived and utilised –the package is often more important than the contents (Williamson 1996). The key message is that communication is a very demanding process and it is best to take an interactive approach (Mattelart and Mattelart 1998).

Links

Third, the framework emphasises the importance of links; of communities, networks and intermediaries in affecting policy change. Some of the current literature focuses explicitly on various types of networks, such as policy (Pross 1986) or epistemic (Haas 1991) communities and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). While understanding remains limited, we do know that networks can play several functions that allow and support the bridging of research and policy. Existing theory stresses the role of translators and communicators (Gladwell 2000) or filters, amplifiers, convenors,

⁴ e.g. Keeley and Scoones (2003); Lindquist (2001); Neilson (2001); Stone, Maxwell and Keating (2001); Sutton (1999)

investors, community builders and facilitators (Mendizabal 2006; Porter and Yeo 2001). It seems that there is often an under-appreciation of the extent and ways that intermediary organizations and networks impact on informal institutions, which in turn influence officials.

External Influences

Fourth, the framework emphasises the impact that external forces and donors' actions have upon research-policy interactions. Key issues here include the impact of international politics and processes, as well as the impact of general donor policies and specific research-funding instruments. Broad incentives, such as EU Accession or the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, can have a substantial impact on the demand for research by policymakers (Court and Young 2003). Trends towards democratization and liberalization and donor support for civil society are also having an impact. Much of the research on development issues is undertaken in industrialised countries, raising issues of access and perceived relevance and legitimacy. Similarly, a substantial amount of research in the poorest countries is funded by international donors, which also raises a range of issues around ownership; priorities; use of external consultants; and perceived legitimacy. As policy processes are becoming increasingly global, this arena is simultaneously increasing in importance.

With this framework in mind, we asked researchers and practitioners from across the developing world to submit case studies of CSOs attempting to use evidence to influence pro-poor policies. The following sections address these factors as well as some of the strategies followed by the CSOs.

The policy context

CSOs in the cases face many different policy contexts. Some are encouragingly open to their participation and receptive of their ideas and experience, such as in the case of the Water Policy formulation in Costa Rica; while others show, time and time again, to be tightly closed and only relatively interested in CSOs demands and participation as in the case of environmental pollution in southern Peru. It is difficult to identify a typology of policy contexts from a few case studies. However, one could argue that they range from those that are extremely closed and controlled by the government (or some interest groups) to those that are significantly open to participation of all sectors. Along this range, there are certain characteristics of the policy context that allow CSOs to influence policy processes; some of which are more important depending on the context.

Windows of opportunity

In relatively closed policy contexts, with few opportunities for engagement, policy windows or windows of opportunity are critical. Even in well controlled systems and in the absence of democratic institutions, it is possible to recognize them. A change or deepening of a policy position as in the case from Uzbekistan can provide civil society with an entry point into the policy process. Here, the emphasis on family values by the President (a commanding figure) allowed a local CSO to engage with the military and introduce domestic violence awareness into the curricula of military academies and schools (typically closed spaces for civil society).

Similarly, international pressures such as the demands of the EU accession process or the increasing interest in environmental sustainability from donors and governments can provide CSOs with key windows through which to push their agendas. This requires a sense of strategic opportunism.

For instance in Bulgaria, the EU accession process has allowed two different CSOs to affect policy processes. Economika used a growing trend in the use of new public policy planning methods to successfully promote strategic planning at the regional level in 2000. Similarly, Coalition 2000, a network of public, private and civil society organisations, took advantage of the anti-corruption demands of the European Union and its call for more and better anti-corruption initiatives to introduce key policy changes to tackle corruption in different public and private arenas.

At the global level, the growing protests against the impact of large dams and against the IFIs in their 50th anniversary had put the key players under considerable pressure. The World Bank, a leading actor, hence approached the World Conservation Union in an attempt to improve their image and counter the strengthened position of CSOs.

Political will

In contexts where decisions are highly centralised and dependent on the will of a few groups or individuals, political will, rather than a conducive institutional framework can make a significant difference. In Pakistan, the most recent thrust in the Youth Policy process has been possible because of President Pervez Musharav's personal interest in it. For a long time before his pronouncement on the subject, the policy draft and the issue lingered at the bottom of the government's agenda. A case of Uganda's PRSP also demonstrates the importance of strong political will. CSOs found an invited space in which to have an effective influence during the process which was initiated by the government.

Fortunately, political will can also be observed through the institutional lens of a country. In Jamaica, the changes to the environmental policies came about in a context of progressive institutional reforms triggered by the government's willingness to fulfil its international obligations under various treaties on the environment and sustainable development. It was therefore relatively easy to promote changes as institutions were already aligned with the objectives sought by CSOs. In Brazil, an education policy change was possible because the Workers' Party has institutionalised civil society participation throughout its structure and in the local and regional governments it runs. This created an institutionally supported political will for change.

Invited spaces

When the policy context is relatively open, additional spaces are available for CSOs' participation. In some cases, these spaces are created by the government into which it 'invites' them CSOs. While this requires strong political will on the part of the government, often more important seems to be the will of those who are supposed to take up CSOs recommendations and advice and incorporate them into the policy

process. A call for proposals for the development of a long term investment plan for Poland is an example of a way in which governments can invite CSOs to participate in the policy process.

The Pakistani Youth Policy process also highlights the importance of invited spaces. This case study focuses not on the policy itself but on the policy process: from being government led to the introduction of consultations with CSOs. For the Pakistani case, this and not the Youth Policy it self, was the focus of the study.

The main problem with these spaces is that they are not necessarily fair or consistent. In some cases they depend on the will of individual politicians or policymakers (as in Pakistan); and in other they are not properly designed or regulated to allow for an effective participation and uptake of the evidence presented, as in some PRSP processes. This is the case of Uganda where poverty reduction was seen as political endeavour towards national unity but the incorporation of CSOs in the PSRP process as compensation for restricted participation in the broader political process encapsulated by the restrictions imposed on political parties in the country. Hence CSOs sometimes need to create their own spaces or influence the invited spaces: changing them to improve the terms of engagement. Failure to do so can be critical for the success of a policy or practice change initiative.

In Kenya, for example, an ActionAid project, unable to provide farmers with a space for effective participation, found it more difficult to mobilise them for influencing the policies of the cashew nut sector. On the other hand, also in Kenya, an industrialists lobby, KAM, was able to use alternative strategies via existing spaces to influence energy policies. The lobby managed to adequate its strategies to the consultative space; contacting policymakers using different means.

A good way of taking advantage of invited spaces is to co-create them with the government. In Costa Rica, FEDEU helped form a technical body for the discussion and promotion of a new water policy but allowed the relevant National Congress' commission to take the lead. CSOs involved in the World Commission on Dams used strong communication networks to maintain a strong united front involving CSOs directly involved in the process and those working from 'outside'.

Evidence

A key factor of the RAPID framework is the way in which different types of research based evidence are used in both policy processes and the strategies followed by CSOs to influence them. Some of the more relevant questions asked about evidence have to do with its origin, type and use. Unfortunately, this is not an issue often reflected upon and it has been difficult to identify a clear role for evidence in the case studies; only a few can illustrate how it was used to influence policy.

The source of the evidence

The source of the evidence is sometimes as important as the evidence itself. It is very difficult for policymakers to check all the evidence available to them therefore they often rely on the reputation of its source as a proxy for its accuracy. Reputation, however, is

subjective and it depends on the decision maker. Advice on human resources will be more easily accepted from a highly reputable human resources consulting firm than from a small NGO. The ODI focuses on research based evidence which can come from multiple sources and origins. Some of the ones identified by the case studies include:

- Academics/researchers in Academic/Research Institutes: Scientific research requires expertise and resources. The support of educational institutes may fulfil this resource gap. In the case of Ghana, under the Presidential special initiative, universities were asked to collaborate with research on non-traditional commodities for the development of a non-traditional export commodities policy in Ghana. In China, respectable legal academics used their credibility and research background to put forward changes in the policies towards vagrants in urban areas; challenging the government's respect of the constitution.
- Field Specialists/ practitioners: Relevant knowledge and expertise of the field or any past accomplishment of the presenter increases the legitimacy the evidence. It seems to convey a significance impact in articulating the arguments and presentation. For instance, the incorporation of two renowned experts into ActionAid's team enabled the campaign to gain greatly from their research experience in the cashew sub-sector. The two presented research papers during the national workshops while ActionAid shared case studies on their successful efforts in cashew rehabilitation in Malindi. The combination of research and case study presentation were critical in the drafting of the policy proposals.
- Governments and international organisations: Past research conducted by various international and national civil society and public sector actors could be a useful source of information on any particular issue. During the process of preparing National Youth Policy in Pakistan the existing profile of youth was being gathered from three sources, all of which originated from the government:
 - Population census of Pakistan 1998.
 - Population Council of Pakistan's survey of Pakistani youth in 2003.
 - Survey by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in 2001

In South Africa, air pollution research was conducted using internationally renowned methods with the actual analysis being done in the United States. This gave the evidence a great deal of credibility. A key element of the source of the evidence is the way that it is being collected. For example, the World Commission on Dams committed itself to be transparent and inclusive in the way that it gathered its evidence. This prevented accusations of an unbalanced use of evidence or preference to some stakeholders over others.

Type of evidence

A question that was rarely answered by the case studies is: what type of evidence was used in the policy influence process? It is difficult to describe evidence in those terms. A way of doing it is by considering evidence of opinion and evidence of action.⁵ Evidence of opinion describes what people say they would do, while evidence of action what they have already done. Evidence of opinion can be counter-argued with the policymaker's own opinion, while evidence of action is not so easily dismissed as it has actually

⁵ This classification is taken from 'Conversations with Disbelievers': <http://www.conversations-with-disbelievers.net/site/about/>

happened. This evidence can be challenged on its relevance based on several factors including accuracy, materiality and applicability. Accuracy refers to whether the evidence is correctly describing what it purports to. There are arithmetical (are the numbers added up correctly?), statistical (where the cause and effect parameter correctly specified?) and representative (do the quotes from people really represent what the body of people felt?) issues that can be considered to address the relevance of evidence.

Evidence of Action: Evidence of action is difficult to contest. This type of evidence shows the effects of a policy or decision. It suggests not what people think will happen or their perceptions but their actions or the effects of a policy on them. Typically, this is the type of evidence often used or cited by researchers and can come from different sources:

- Surveys: (a) Questionnaire (mail, email, phone, household, etc.) and (b) Observations
The Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) used evidence of action based on field research, in particular a survey, to measure the demand for energy by region. The questionnaire they used included sections on use and demand; technology and capacity utilization; and environmental issues.
- Pilot projects:
Pilot projects are excellent examples of evidence of action. CSOs use them to prove that an idea in fact works. Pilot projects are often used for testing any particular approach or methodology. The success of pilot project leads to necessary modifications and possible replication elsewhere. In this way, the pilot project could be used as an evidence for pursuing any particular reforms by referring the results/findings of a pilot project.

For example, the introduction of anticorruption education in the Bulgarian secondary school system was promoted by the CSOs of Coalition 2000 through pre-testing of teaching programs and methodologies; designing and publishing of teaching and study materials (manuals, CDs, on-line materials); developing new forms for in-class and out-of-class anticorruption education (e.g. essay contests, visits to public institutions by high-school students, the introduction of peer school mediators for resolving conflicts at the secondary school, etc.). This showed the policymakers that it was a viable option. In Kenya, ActionAid tried to use the Tanzania experience as a pilot, showing that it had been successful elsewhere; although this did get farmers interested in the early stages of the campaign it failed to show that it was relevant to the Kenyan context.

In Brazil, the Popular Centre for Culture and Development (CPCD) had successfully implemented a series of education projects in local schools and nurseries before the municipal government agreed to award it the administration of the education system. Their methods and initiatives had been tested and approved by the community and the government; this satisfied possible doubts they might have had regarding their capacity to deliver.

- Impact Assessment or policy analysis:
Often lacking from CSOs research is policy analysis of assessments. Researchers and practitioners usually focus on the situation of specific groups or the social and economic causes of poverty or problems but leave out the effects of policies on the poor: good or bad. The lack of policy analysis skills means that there is little evidence

of the actual effects of policies, what works and what doesn't and how to change them to make them work. In some cases, CSOs can provide that evidence.

For example, in Armenia, the CSO sector assessed USAID's strategy originally focused on the provision of grant funds with restricted professional intervention into CSO management and institutional development. According to the assessment the strategy failed to produce the expected results. This led a change in the strategy and more focus on institutional development; advocacy for constituency interests, improvement of CSOs regulating legislation and promotion of CSOs partnerships with the government, media and private sector.

- Participatory appraisal –qualitative evidence

Other methods include more participatory processes which make use of experiences and anecdotes rather than objective responses of observations. As a consequence, participatory appraisals are not statistically robust and are better used to complement quantitative evidence. The Centre for Science and Environment in New Delhi, for example, used research on the traditional wisdom of rural India in conserving rainwater and attempted to impact national water management practices and policy. In Brazil, CPCD developed a series of educational products and their educational approach through direct involvement with the communities. In Kenya, KAM complimented their statistical evidence from surveys with qualitative anecdotes and examples. ActionAid's cashew nut campaign, on the other hand, focused only evidence from participatory processes and was unable to strengthen the experiences of the farmers with robust quantitative evidence more appropriate for engaging with policymakers. Although the farmers were able to identify the main causes for cashew nut production decline, it would have been necessary to compliment their observations with other types of research.

In the Philippines, CSOs collected life stories of child domestic workers that illustrated the complexity and urgency of the problem. This was complemented by a quantitative analysis of the value of their labour to make a case for action.

- Scientific quantitative evidence:

This type of evidence was particularly relevant for Labor's case at the International Water Tribunal. Scientific evidence is difficult to disprove (assuming it was done properly) but often interpreted differently by different actors. Each might award it different value and choose to give it more or less importance in their decision making processes. The same evidence that the tribunal considered as crucial for their decision was disregarded for years by the Peruvian government. The same is true for the cases of air pollution in India and South Africa.

Evidence of opinion: Unlike evidence of action, evidence of opinion is easier to contest. Evidence of opinion often informs both policymakers and CSOs about the other's opinions or perceptions on specific issues as well as of the general public's position. These can be very useful for influencing decision makers who are themselves susceptible to popular scrutiny. Some of the research tools to collect evidence of opinion include:

- Field surveys
- Online surveys
- Phone surveys

- Focus groups

Anti-corruption initiatives seem to be more closely linked with the use of evidence of opinion than other development efforts. For example, each year the Batory Foundation's Anti corruption programme commissions a public opinion poll in Poland, on the basis of which an indicator called 'corruption barometer' is produced. By asking the same questions every year they verify how the attitude of society to the problem and scale of corruption changes. Together with the poll, each year, they conduct in-depth research on corruption problems in specific aspects of social life. A similar approach is followed by Coalition 2000 in Bulgaria that has developed a series of surveys and perception and opinion monitoring indexes and mechanisms. They use these indexes to 'name and shame' those considered as most corrupt but also to inform policymakers, as well as the 'shamed' groups, of ways in which to improve their social standing. The perception and opinion surveys are therefore used as monitoring systems by civil society, the private sector and the public sector.

The information used in each case, whether it is opinion or action can be qualitative or quantitative. For example, Coalition 2000's corruption monitoring system and media monitoring system provides evidence of opinion as well as of action in qualitative and quantitative form. It generates information about the structure and dynamics of corrupt behaviour, the scope and dynamics of corruption related attitudes, assessments and expectations of the general public, of public sector officials, and of specific social and professional groups. In general CSOs are well aware that the strength of any one piece of evidence increases with the availability of complementary evidence, in other forms. This reduces the opposition from those who might not value any one particular type of evidence.

The presentation of the evidence

The presentation of the different types of evidence is also very important –but received equally limited attention in the case studies analysed in this paper. The presentation of evidence can be instrumental in achieving its desired impact. For example, the Philippine life stories presented as case studies, or the scientific evidence of pollution in southern Peru presented as hard facts had the desired effects in their respective contexts. The combination of different types and sources of evidence provides CSOs with a much stronger position before the policy processes they are trying to affect. And the use of different means of presentation can add to that effect: The World Commission on Dams knowledge base had four pillars: case studies, thematic reviews, dam surveys and submissions from regional consultations. More on presentation is discussed in the Practices section below.

Links

The third component of the RAPID framework looks into the links that exist between all policy actors. Links can help explain how and why an idea or evidence can be taken up by the policy process and used to inform policy; or not. The cases highlight the roles of three types of links: between civil society and policymakers; between civil society and the international community; and within civil society.

Links between CSOs and policy makers

The most straight forward link or relation to affect policy is that between the researchers and the policymakers themselves. This, unfortunately, is often the most difficult one to establish and maintain. The case studies show that successful linkages often take time and resources; they depend greatly on the context and on personal/private relations. In Peru, for example, Labor was able to develop a strong and long lasting link with the local government when one of its associates was elected to govern the city of Ilo. Although this relation was unable to influence the practices of the local mining company and the national environmental policies, it did have an effect on the local government's position on the issue. It was also this relationship that allowed the CSO to access funds and support from international donors – who valued the strong relation between civil society and the public sector. And it was the support from these allies that allowed Labor to eventually influence policy at the national level – after 20 years of work.

The Brazilian case is also a good example of linkages between CSOs and policymakers. In this case, CPCD was in part able to make a case for their role in running the local education system through its close connections with the local Mayor. In this case, the relationship was closely linked to the Workers Party slow rise to power from the Brazilian grassroots and its previous experiences with CSOs such as in participatory budgeting initiatives.

In the Philippines, this link can be seen in a different way. When the agenda or preferences of the government of Quezon City in Metro Manila became aligned with those of the CSOs trying to change the policies on domestic workers in the country, these two groups developed a relationship. This link was crucial to encourage other local governments and national policymakers to act on the issue. Hence, links between policy makers and CSOs do not need to be long term nor formal partnerships. They can evolve or simply appear. What is important is that they are used.

Links with International Networks and Alliances – A way of achieving Legitimacy

Membership to international networks and coalitions is seen as a source of legitimacy and recognition for local CSO, according to the case studies. It also enhances their credibility among the media, general public, government and the donor community. The case studies show that in some cases, international networks are used as a 'boomerang' effect: rather than influencing policy directly they influence an international actor who in turn influences the government. The choice of this strategy, as well as the specific links, must respond to the policy context and the value that policymakers give international actors. It would be useless, as it was pointed out in the case study from China, to attempt to get a foreign ally to influence the Chinese government on constitutional reform.

The Peruvian case illustrates the boomerang effect quite well. Faced with great opposition from the mining company and the national government the CSO, Labor, took the case to the International Water Tribunal. Unlike the government, this institution was interested in the evidence collected by Labor. A positive ruling meant that other international actors such as influential transnational corporations like Shell, with interests

in the mine but with public relations problems, were forced to take a clear position on the issue and sided with the CSO. The government and the mine were thus forced to take notice and change their policies and practices.

On the other hand, when farmers in Kenya wanted to promote changes in cashew policies, they realized that unlike the coffee sector that has strong linkages with international organisations and lobby groups (e.g. East African Fine Coffee Association). The cashew sub-sector did not have any links to help in terms of building international pressure. International organisations also play vital roles in supporting national level organisations. For example, Transparency International provides data related to corruption from around the globe, which supports its national chapters. A regional or international cashew association might have provided the Kenyan campaign with the necessary evidence and resources to gain support from farmers and policymakers.

The World Commission on Dams case study illustrates the example of a well organised global coalition of civil society organisations that was able to present a united front against a disunited opposition in the dam industry. Cooperation between CSOs in the process (in the commission) and out side of the process was possible because of the existing relations between CSOs.

Role of networks and alliances at the national level

At the national level, CSOs are more likely to come together in the shape of networks of their peers. These networks can fulfil different functions including filtering and/or amplifying information, investing/providing to their members, convening different types of members and actors, facilitating their own work and building strong communities (Mendizabal 2006). In contexts in which the space for engagement is limited or when a certain theme is too fragmented, umbrella organisations that can coordinate CSOs' response have proven useful. The Pakistani youth policy case study highlights the role played by two large umbrella organisations in the consultative process with the government; similarly, the Nepalese cases of community resource management illustrate the importance of strength by numbers that often gives weak minority groups a louder voice and therefore a large stake in the process.

But networks are not always used to confront policymakers. Coalition 2000 used the same approach to incorporate all actors into the process. The convening function of Coalition 2000 allows people and groups to address an issue that is usually 'untouchable'. Anti-corruption commissions or initiatives always face fierce opposition from all fronts (after all, corruption is endemic); a network guaranteed that all parties were part of the fight rather than the problem. The Costa Rican case highlights the same lessons: multi-stakeholder networks can help build support for policy changes beyond the agenda setting stage.

External factors

As briefly discussed above, 'boomerang' links provide CSOs with alternative strategies for policy influence. However, external factors are not just foreign actors. These include frameworks of action such as international agreements or institutions; global economic

and political trends or shocks such as the rise of the Chinese economy or the War in Iraq. The RAPID framework also considers the roles of factors such as socio-cultural structures and processes that may be national or local but are exogenous to the specific policy processes; and can have significant effects on them and their outcomes.

Global and local trends and events

More often than not, foreign influences are seen as negative to local development. Economic and political trends can affect the way in which national governments function and relate to their civil societies. However, sometimes, trends open up new spaces of participation and introduce ideas and solutions that were not present before. Participation, for example, is a concept that has been mainstreamed by donors (even though participatory mechanisms have existed in most cultures around the world). In many countries, the PRSP processes became the first opportunity for CSOs to engage with the policy process.

Participation, however, has not meant that governments have been more open to alternatives. Hence when the Kenyan government opened a space for participation in its energy policy, it did so within certain parameters. This allowed CSOs such as KAM to participate more effectively than those whose views did not necessarily fit those parameters of industrial modernisation and global competitiveness.

Global events such as the International Youth Day can also help local CSOs to place their issues at the top of the agenda—even if it is for one day. In Pakistan, this event was used to attract the attention of the government and the general media. Similarly, international agreements or declarations provide useful frameworks for CSOs to work with. For instance, the UN convention on climate change; the declaration of human rights and the rights of children; conventions on the treatment of minorities and indigenous populations; regional integration agreements and trade negotiations; all have significant effects on what can be discussed, how it is discussed and who participates in the debate.

In Coalition 2000's case, external trends were crucial. Not only was anti-corruption an issue influenced by the demands of the EU accession process, but the choice of introducing anti-corruption into the education system was also influenced by the designation of the year 2005 as the 'Year of Democratic Citizenship through Education' by the Council of Europe. Corruption and education, simultaneously, became priorities for the Bulgarian government.

Local processes such as the modernisation of the Kenyan industry or the efforts to attract foreign capital can also help explain why certain ideas are more successful than others. In Kenya the energy policies respond to the demands of industrialists rather than the general public whose use of energy sources is diametrically different. And in Peru, the behaviour of the Peruvian government is explained by its fear of losing foreign investment: first by not attacking the transnational corporation responsible for the contamination and then by responding to international pressures to avoid negative responses from the international markets.

In Brazil, participatory governance and budgeting are part of a national trend that has become increasingly institutionalised. The participation of civil society in policy

processes has therefore become more acceptable and, even, desirable.

Other policy processes are global in nature. The World Commission on Dams was addressing global policy changes and hence international factors played an important role. Against the process was the tension between global policymaking and national sovereignty and many governments' reluctance to give up their power to regulate dams in their own countries. For the change was the unity of CSOs at the international level after years of ongoing campaigning against individual dams and the IFIs.

Underlying socio-cultural trends

Socio-cultural factors and trends affect policy process dearly. In Uzbekistan, for example, an ongoing political process to enhance the value of the family as the core of society provided an entry point for a CSO interested in changing the behaviours of men towards women. They were able to influence the government (in this case the Ministry of Defence) to introduce domestic violence into the curricula of military academies and schools by appealing to the underlying family values narrative. In Nepal, indigenous minority groups faced eviction from their land as a consequence of these socio-cultural issues. Due to the unjust social structure and power relations that permeate Nepali society, these marginalized social groups were excluded from the community forest user groups that were designated to manage the forest and its resources by the government.

In the Philippines, CSOs had to fight against a social discourse that chooses to disregard the voice of domestic workers, in particular children. CSOs had to address this before they could attempt to change any policies.

Resource mobilisation by international donors

Donors and international partners can sometimes support CSOs in a more direct manner. Whether with financial or technical support, they can make it possible for CSOs to engage with the policy process in a sustainable and more effective way.

Research is a resource intensive activity. In many developing countries CSOs could not be able pursue a research because of their limited resources. In these cases the support of international donors, particularly through commissioned projects allows them to function and influence policy. In Jamaica, the changes in the environmental and conservation policies that entrusted CSOs with the management of protected areas were partly possible because of a USAID funded programme. The initiative both created the necessary evidence to conceptualise the policy change and promoted its implementation. In the Philippines, CSOs were helped by the ILO and Anti-Slavery International in the production of evidence and the implementation of advocacy strategies.

Various international organisations supported the process of preparing the youth policy for Pakistan. The UNDP and the responsible ministry appointed an international consultant to provide technical assistance between 1992 and 1993. Then, in 2001, UNICEF supported the Ministry of Youth Affairs to conduct provincial consultation workshops and one national workshop in Islamabad to gather different views to inform

the development of the policy. The Rockefeller Foundation and the UNPF gave their financial inputs for one of the youth surveys conducted by the Population Council of Pakistan in 2003. Later, in September 2004, the Ministry started a fresh campaign for the Pakistani Youth Policy, with the support of the Royal Norwegian Embassy.

In the Peruvian case, Labor benefited from financial support from IDRC for conducting the research on the impact on pollution by Southern Peru Copper Corporation's mining activities which was later used in the trial at the International Water Tribunal in 1991.

Technical support (as mentioned in the case of the youth policy in Pakistan) is also very important for CSOs (and governments). In Kenya, KAM realised its limited capacities in the area of policy formation and thus approached the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) for help. UNIDO recruited an expert in the field of industrialization, energy and environmental protection to help KAM through this process. On behalf of KAM, the expert attended the appropriate committees and carried out the necessary background research and lobbying actions.

Practices

Besides the findings of the previous sections, we consider it important to learn more about how CSOs try to influence policy. Hence we asked what means they used to communicate their messages, how do they package their evidence and what type of strategies they follow. In some cases, these questions are relatively easier to answer. In most, unfortunately, it is not at all clear. We explain this in two ways. First, writing good case studies requires a skill that few researchers have and that we ought to develop. Second, most of the times, policy entrepreneurs respond to the context in an opportunistic manner and do not know what, among the things they did, actually worked.

We have been able to identify some of these means, messages and strategies and present them as an annotated list. However, it is difficult to say what constitutes a best or bad practice.

Means of Communication

Several media have been discussed in the case studies as having been used to present the evidence in each process:

Print media: By far the most preferred means of communication is print media. Research based institutions or researchers tend to prefer books or academic papers as the focal-point of their communication strategies. Service delivery CSOs or practitioners on the other hand, report the use of press releases, pamphlets or other shorter and more accessible material. Books as well seem to be highly regarded by CSOs –even if policymakers do not read them. Their effects are considered unpredictable both in scope and in timing.

In 1995, all the material produced by Labor to support its case at the Water Tribunal was published by one of its associates, Doris Balvín, under the title 'Water, mining and pollution: the SPCC case'. This book would be the cornerstone for other specialized studies about the environmental problems of Ilo, based on the systematization of

relevant information regarding air and water pollution. Labor also took advantage of international media and many of the first articles were published in Europe and later picked up by the Peruvian newspapers.

In the case of Pollution, Public Health and Policymaking in Delhi the Centre for Science and Environment organized public hearings, debates on national television, disseminated academic reports and a host of polemic articles and pamphlets on vehicular pollution and its deadly impact on the environment. They also published a book on the effects of pollution, referring to it as 'slow murder'. This multi-prong approach is probably the best to create awareness as well as to influence policymakers to prioritize a policy issue. Still, the focus on the book was made clear by the case.

Multimedia: Unfortunately, multimedia was relatively absent from the cases. Anticorruption initiatives did use it, though. In Poland and Bulgaria, the awareness raising campaigns included the use of billboards and TV and radio shows. In Uganda, the PRSP process also included an original use of radio and TV talk-shows allowing citizens to phone in with their own queries and recommendations to be later on included in the policy process. But in general, there were not many examples to draw from.

Even less popular seems to have been the use of the internet and other information and communication technologies. Electronic media may play a powerful role for raising awareness on obscure issues. During the process of conducting consultative process from the youth, CSOs in Pakistan took advantage of online resources and an online youth conference was organized to review the youth policy in 2003. In most other cases, the internet was not mentioned.

Events, celebrations, demonstrations: High profile events can also be used to communicate a message. The celebration of the International Youth Day and inviting major policy makers like the Education Minister as a chief guest to the event was very useful for highlighting the demands of Pakistani civil society and pushing their agenda. These events were used by CSOs in Pakistan to amplify various issues and messages and present relevant evidence.

In Nepal, grassroots were supported by CDO, a research centre, to develop and implement non-violent protests and organized a series of demonstrations to draw the attention of the media and policymakers to their cause. The choice of demonstrations or protests as means of conveying a message is mentioned by various cases and corroborated by participants of the Civil Society Partnerships Programme's workshops in developing countries.

Workshops or Public meetings: Almost all cases reported the use of workshops of small scale meetings between policymakers and CSOs as a key aspect of their policy influence strategy. In the cases of Kenya and Nepal, workshops also served as a means of raising awareness among the 'beneficiaries' as well as to develop strong communities. Nonetheless, it is unclear what effect these meetings have on policy influence. Only in a few cases they were intentionally built into the strategy; in most cases they 'just happened'.

Strategies

The choice of the right means of communication or messenger is some times as, or more, important than the message it self. Some of the cases reviewed had clear strategies that involved the identification of an audience, choice of means and production and use of evidence. The World Commission on Dams, ActionAid and KAM's experiences describe a clear strategy; albeit with different outcomes; partly explained by the development of a clear strategy by the latter. In fact, the World Commission on Dams' strategy is founded in clear guiding principles (transparency and inclusiveness) which give it additional coherence and, possibly, credibility. The Peruvian case study, on the other hand, is a good example of strategic opportunism; Labor prepared it self over a long period of time and responded adequately as a window of opportunity finally and unexpectedly opened with the International Water Tribunal.

Others, like in the case from China, do not show any type of recognisable strategy. In this case, Chinese civil society, in particular academics and political or judicial interest groups or individuals, responded to a case that drew the attention of the general public. It could be regarded as strategic opportunism had it been properly organised or managed (or networked); but in fact it is closer to an effective spontaneous opportunism.

A structured strategy approach through-out policy process: There are a few cases where it is possible to identify a clear structured strategy. One is the World Commission on Dams. Another is Bulgaria's Coalition 2000 that developed a broad set of strategic parameters and structures that guide specific initiatives. Hence, Coalition 2000's approach of using evidence from their monitoring systems and taking advantage of pilot projects and spaces of engagement with policymakers and other interested parties is clearly structured.

In another example, the Centre for Science and Environment adopted a structured strategy for what they term knowledge-based activism. It included a pre-launch phase in which the team put together a document which include all the relevant evidence on the problem as well as the proposed solutions –which were in turn used to rally people and institutions around the main issue; and a post-launch phase targeted at key opinion-makers through a diverse range of means.

A strong leadership: In contexts with little public participation, strong leadership can be an asset for CSOs. In these cases, CSOs seek to identify potential leaders who can champion their cause beyond the civil society arena and into the policy process. In Peru, Labor was greatly benefited by the election of one of its associates to the local government. In Kenya, KAM hired a strong and charismatic leader to take its message to the policy process; and who was responsible for much of the research and lobbying decisions.

A dependence on leadership, however, can be dangerous. In Kenya, participants at a Policy Entrepreneurs workshop in November 2005, considered that, as part of the democratization reforms, many civil society leaders joined the public sector CSOs remained virtually decapitated.

Empowering the beneficiaries: The Nepalese case studies demonstrate the value of regular dialogue and discussions with the stakeholders of any given initiative. In both cases, research institutions developed strategies that involved the affected groups and that saw them become the agents of change. They supplied them with the necessary skills and resources (including evidence) to advocate for change and accompanied them

in the process. In the Philippines, Visayan Forum Foundation undertook a project that aimed to empower domestic workers to become agents of change. This is a particularly important strategy. Unlike other cases in which CSOs who attempt to influence policy themselves, these describe CSOs that see policy influence as an end as well as a means to empowerment.

The Kenya cashew nut case also involved a series of workshops and meetings with stakeholders but its strategy was not developed with the farmers and this probably contributed to the failure to mobilise them accordingly.

Trust, reciprocity and cooperation between key policy makers and CSOs are essential. Trust could be the result of path dependency, such as past personal contacts or could be built through other initiatives. The process of building trust is a gradual process and needs a long term commitment by the CSOs. Constant engagement may lead to a strong and sustainable relationship which is critical for the successful implementation of policy influence strategies. This is clearly observed in the case of the World Commission on Dams that was able to sustain an international initiative. Trust, in this case, was partly built on past experiences of collaborative work suggesting the importance of building and sustaining coalitions of practice or networks around key issues.

Targeting and attracting the support of policymakers: Just as civil society leaders can play key roles in championing a cause, key policymakers can advance the interests of civil society. The best example is the case of Pakistan, where the involvement of President Musharaff, at a time when the youth policy debate had all but died, revived the issue and mobilized policymakers into action. Personal interest and involvement of key policy actors is an added advantage for bringing a policy change. However, CSOs cannot rely on this sudden interest from leaders.

Coalition 2000's strategy of encompassing civil society, the private sector and the public sector aims at bringing together all the different stakeholders. This has awarded them ownership of the recommendations of the network.

When the book on air pollution, titled *Slow Murder*, came out in late 1996, the Centre for Science and Environment requested Shri KR Narayanan, the vice-president of India, to launch the book, not at a public place but at his own residence. This guaranteed that other top officials, including ministers and key corporate figures (of the transport industry) attended. The media also gave it a significant coverage and within weeks, the Supreme Court took notice of the issue and ordered the Delhi government to take action.

In a case study from Albania that addressed the process for improving community policing and increasing the security level of communities, the minister of Public Order took personal interest and encouraged the project. However the main role was played by the Director of the State Police who not only participated in the most important meetings, but also encouraged his regional colleagues to do the same.

The Costa Rican case shows that the development of a new water policy was possible due to the alignment of interests among some of the key policy actors. Even with opposition from powerful private and public interest groups, the inclusion of the National Congress and other policy makers of the main technical group guaranteed a buy-in from the authorities. CSOs leadership and resources would not have been enough.

Persistence: Although it might sound unnecessary to mention this, often CSOs make the mistake of expecting change to happen right away. The ActionAid experience in the Cashew nut sector in Kenya acknowledges that it would have been necessary to develop a stronger base of support to endure a long term policy influence process. Policy influence takes a long time and requires persistence. Labor in Peru has carried out a 20 year long campaign. Throughout this period it gained credibility by developing its evidence and capacity as an organization that earned Labor a space in an international court of justice. It would be wrong to focus on Labor's participation in the International Water Tribunal alone. Without its previous work it would not have been able to succeed at the trial.

Many times, a policy window opens up and CSOs take advantage of it. Sometimes they fail to recognize that the policy influence process begun many years before. The youth policy process in Pakistan is marked by many years of hurdles until the issue was adopted by the President. Nonetheless civil society had prepared up to that moment by developing strong national networks and producing relevant evidence.

Providing a solution/answer rather than focusing on the mistakes: Sometimes, CSOs keep highlighting only the wrongdoings of governments without suggesting any alternatives. More often than not, this process ends with no beneficial outputs. An alternative strategy is to provide a plausible solution to the problems highlighted. It will minimize the efforts for policy actors as well as tempt them to consider the given options.

All the successful cases illustrate this point in one way or another: by providing alternatives to policies or specific articles in the law, or by demonstrating their solutions with pilot projects. In the case of Uzbekistan, for example, the CSO Ikbol attempted to change a practice (domestic violence) by addressing a seemingly unrelated problem faced by the government (indiscipline in the military). This is a critical lesson. Rather than attempting to fight a battle over a problem that would not have been regarded as important by the government, Ikbol decided to help policymakers by addressing a problem that it had already recognised it faced; and that Ikbol knew would also address the problem it had identified.

In Costa Rica, CSOs developed a strong research-based argument using comparative studies of successful experience in other countries. Thus, they offered the government tested solutions to surpass the problems faced.

Similarly, in late 2003, the Bishkek Business Club members and experts from the Economic Policy Institute began an advocacy campaign for Tax Legislation reform. They formed a working group, which conducted research and attracted stakeholders for discussing and promoting amendments to the current Tax Legislation. The working group drafted necessary amendments and submitted them to the Ministry of Finance and the Parliament committee on custom, tax and other fees.

In Brazil, the government of Araújo found in a local CSO an ally in its own work. The CPCD presented a solution to the government's problems. The same thing happened in Jamaica where CSOs were seen as allies to the government and excellent candidates to implement its policies.

What is new?

The cases collected so far have confirmed many of the conclusions arrived at from the consultations with and other analysis of the strategies and practices of CSOs in developing countries. However, they have also highlighted some new issues that have not been given enough attention before.

Invited spaces

Invited spaces constitute an important factor in bridging research and policy. They are spaces in which CSOs have no or little control over the terms of engagement and must therefore often adapt their strategies. Invited spaces, as in the cases considered above are also not always entirely open which means that sometimes a significant proportion of the policy process remains out of touch, and out of sight, of CSOs. We still need to learn more about how CSOs engage in these processes, what strategies they follow, how beneficial they really are and how their as well as other's evidence influences the outcomes.

CSOs do not always think about using evidence

The cases, or rather the writing process for the cases, shows that not much thought is given to how a particular type of evidence and its products can be used to influence policy. The descriptions of the influence processes were often de-linked from those of the evidence used by CSOs. Evidence type was also unexplored in the lessons learned section. The writing process involved a series of discussions (using the 'track changes' function in Word and emails) which might have contributed to a more systematic analysis of the role of evidence; but this was still not enough.

The cases also suggested that in general evidence is produced as a matter of routine (or process) rather than with the policy influence objective in mind. I believe this makes it more difficult to link with the strategies as they were not conceived together; evidence was produced independently and included into the influence strategy as and when needed.

International networks

Another factor, highlighted, in many of the cases we have collected is the role of international networks or links. These play an important role in local CSOs capacity to leverage change or access alternative strategies for policy influence. Still, it is not clear (at least it was not clear from the cases) how these links came about. Is there a practical lesson for CSOs to learn or are these links more likely to be developed in an opportunistic manner?

CSOs do influence policy

Probably the most important conclusion from the cases and from the process of collecting them and writing this report is that CSOs do influence policy. They might not influence policy as much as they would want to; and maybe that influence is harder to achieve than they would desire; but the cases and the proposals suggest that CSOs are

influencing policy and that evidence plays a role.

This is an important lesson because it means that we need to consider the communication of lessons to other CSOs as the focus of our work. It also means that we ought to know more about what 'enough' influence might be in any particular context. Quite clearly, CSOs cannot influence policies all the time –they are hardly ever legitimate political actors. And there are other policy actors that have the same right and responsibility to participate in policy debates (the private sector, public agencies). Is there a right balance?

Relative change is important

Often when thinking about change –and stories of change- we set our sights on clear inflection points. This focus sometimes leads to missing subtle shifts in trends or marginal improvements that may lead to these more structural changes. The Pakistani case is an example of this. By no means can we consider the 'consultation processes' that occurred around the Youth Policy and truly participatory one –or an example for future ones. However, it is relatively significant: it signifies the beginning of a new way of designing policies in this context.

The cases have not dwelled much on this and have, instead, focused on clear changes: a new law, a new policy document, a new agreement. However, progressive changes in the behaviours of key policy actors are equally important and ought to be documented.

Conclusions

It is difficult to select a definite set of conclusions from these case studies; particularly, since there is a natural selection bias: those submitting their cases were probably eager to show their success. It is also non-definitive because few of those submitting a case, had actually thought about these issues of research-policy linkages before hand; and the exercise did not provide the appropriate framework for a thorough assessment. Nonetheless, there are some conclusions that can be highlighted and from which individual users might want to consider those that are applicable to their own contexts and circumstances.

Context matters: The policy context in which a CSO exists and works defines its capacity to gather and use evidence. It affects its choice of strategy as well as their chances of success. Context, however, is not the end of it. CSOs can be successful even in the most difficult contexts as shown by the cases.

Research based evidence is still hard to acquire: The move from service delivery to policy influence of many southern CSOs has not been accompanied by the development of the capacities and skills to research and use evidence in policy processes. CSOs are still very limited in this respect and most of the evidence gathered was insufficient or inadequate to one or more policy actors, instances or processes. In some cases, most of the evidence was in fact collected during the actual process of influence.

There is not enough thought or effort being placed into choosing and developing research products: CSOs are faced with significant resource constraints; hence

research products are often the most common and relatively inexpensive ones: statistics, academic papers or books. Audiovisual, multimedia, pilot projects and others are less common but nonetheless important. These require specific skills that might be too expensive for individual CSOs to acquire. .

Links are important for CSOs: Small scale CSOs tend to network with institutions closer to them and find it relatively more difficult to find or establish regional, national or international links. These links or networks are more often established to support their own work. Few of the linkages are strategic to actively seek change (like those of Coalition 2000 or Labor). In a context where CSOs are already facing several barriers to policy influence, rallying around strong umbrella organisations or networks can have positive results; but can also be an expensive endeavour.

Long term links matter even more: Policy change processes are long term and therefore long term linkages, partnerships or networks are better prepared to deal with their opportunistic requirements and setbacks.

Individuals matter for change: As much as links and networks are important, individuals and their actions seem to have made a difference in many of the cases. They have facilitated the formation of strong CSO-policymakers bonds, the uptake of research into the policy process, the resilience of a campaign, access to the media or critical policy choices. Leadership is an important aspect of the personalities of policy entrepreneurs. While the cases did not consider this, it is possible to suggest that building the leadership capacities of friendly-policymakers would constitute a positive strategy for policy change.

The external environment is influential but largely hidden: There is only a limited amount of information regarding the various actors and forces that constitute the external environment of a policy process. In some cases, however, CSOs have been able to assess the real contributions or problems attributable to these external forces. The cases from Peru and Bulgaria were quite clear on this. In most cases, unfortunately, the external environments were reduced to the existence of international treaties or conferences that might or might not have influenced a particular policymaker's ideas; or external funding sources.

Engagement vs. confrontation: Most successful examples have included some sort of continuous and long term engagement with the government; rather than outright confrontation. In some cases a mix of confrontation to raise the profile of the issue and engagement to provide solutions has proved to be useful. Negotiation, collaboration and responsiveness are engagement qualities that require command over the appropriate research based evidence.

Successful confrontation cases have involved conflict resolution skills such as in Nepal and the use of formal alternative institutions such as international bodies or the judicial system.

Evidence matters, after all: In various cases evidence was critical in the decision making process of key policy actors or influences. More importantly, evidence mattered when it was relevant and accurate (to the problem and the audience). The cases did not all assess whether evidence mattered for good policymaking; although some did acknowledge that the policy changes had brought about positive benefits for those

concerned.

Evidence of success matters more: Policy decisions are difficult for politicians. Their preferences are not necessarily aligned with the recommendations of researchers. Hence, successful pilot project can help reduce the ex-ante transaction costs that policymakers incur in when trying to decide between alternative policy options. A successful case study reduced the policymaker's doubts and the time he or she might dedicate to assessing the policy; as they increase the CSO's credibility.

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Annex

Selected case studies – 2 page summaries

1. Can the poor influence policy? Lessons from the Cashewnut revitalization campaign in Kenya coast

Elphas Ojiambo

Introduction

Cashew is among the oldest cash crops in Kenya; introduced into East Africa by the Portuguese during the Sixteenth Century. Although cashew contributes with only 1% of Kenya's total agricultural production, it is an important crop because it is grown in an area with few alternative other alternatives. During the peak period of the cashew industry (1980s), it was a major export earner contributing with 4% of GDP. However, mismanagement and privatization of the Kenya Cashewnut Limited in 1993 and its eventual closure in 1998 had a devastating effect on farmers whose livelihood had for years depended on it. The cashew campaign sought to draw farmers and policymaker's interest in the Cashew trees, hitherto neglected.

The type and extent of policy change

The objective was to work with farmers in order to influence both the agenda setting and formulation of the Cashewnut Policy and Act. Whereas the campaign managed to draw farmers' interest in proper tree husbandry thus increasing production, little change was evident at the policy level. Neither a cashewnut policy nor Act is in place despite the efforts since 2001.

Some thoughts on the failure to achieve a policy change

The political context

The political leadership in the Coast region has always bemoaned the collapse of the cashew industry but has done little to change the situation. Nonetheless, during the 2002 election, the revitalization of the cashew industry became part of the campaign manifesto for the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), the current ruling party. Since, there have been significant reforms in the sugar, coffee and tea sub-sectors in Kenya – none of which are grown in this region. Although the Government identified cashew revitalisation as part of its Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, nothing is there to show.

International factors

Three broad international factors need to be mentioned here. Firstly, the Bretton Woods institutions have had tremendous and negative influence in policy formulation process in Kenya. The withdrawal of agricultural subsidies during the Structural Adjustment Programme provided the campaign with limited options amid growing poverty. Secondly, unlike the Coffee sector that has strong international organisations and lobby groups e.g. East African Fine Coffee Association, the cashew sub-sector did not have any that would in one way or the other help in terms of building international pressure. Thirdly, the demand for cashew has been growing tremendously world over as a result of the liberalisation of cashew markets.

CSOs strategies for policy change

Another international factor was the influence of neighbouring Tanzania, where the cashew sub-sector is a major foreign exchange earner. Following a visit to Tanzania, a

team from Bayer East Africa started a pilot programme with Choice Humanitarian, the Coast Development Authority, KARI and the Ministry of Agriculture, in 2000, to control powdery mildew. Demonstrations held in 2001 drew the interest of ActionAid which sent farmers on an exposure visit to Tanzania. Through this collaborative arrangement a spray gang concept was introduced. The positive results provided the necessary evidence to mobilise farmers with the objective to create an enabling environment for a cashew nut policy; develop the capacity of farmers, extension workers and others in the sector to take a leading role; and facilitate networking and information sharing among all stakeholders. Though shared by all campaign team members was not adhered to by most farmers.

ActionAid Kenya played an essential facilitation role. At the community level, it mobilised the farmers in its programme areas. At the meso level, ActionAid played a crucial role by linking the farmers with input suppliers and cashew buyers. Further linkages were made with KARI and the Ministry of Agriculture to train government extension officers on tree husbandry and the introduction of high yielding varieties. At the Regional/national level, ActionAid supported three national workshops sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture and that were aimed at developing the cashew policy draft. Furthermore, the incorporation of top researchers in the field contributed to the development of an evidence-based draft policy.

Through these efforts a draft policy and Articles and Memorandum of Association for the establishment of the Cashewnut council were developed, reviewed and submitted to the Ministry. A cabinet paper was drafted by the Ministry, submitted to the Cabinet but nothing has been heard since then. In retrospect, the missing linkage was at the policy formulation level especially at the Parliamentary level. This contributed to the collapse of the campaign and the absence of a final policy.

Nature of research based-evidence

Different types of evidence were collected and developed through different means; including case studies, academic research and a feasibility study on cashew nut production in the coastal region. Participatory rural appraisals were also carried out in different districts to identify priorities and the causes of the decline in the sector's activity. Probably most importantly, the type of evidence that kick-started the process was comparative evidence from Tanzania. The neighbouring country's experience served as a pilot project for undecided farmers and policymakers.

Conclusions and lessons learned

Whereas significant changes have been realized in terms of scaling up production, little has been seen at the policy front. Among the contributing factors for the failure, it is possible to highlight the poverty afflicting the vast majority of the farmers and the limited capacity of ActionAid and other members of the campaign to build the necessary force to push the policy agenda at the national level. Other factors include a lack of support from the political leadership and failure by the stakeholders to act in unison. The campaign was seen as an ActionAid campaign making the actors always to wait for direction from it.

2. The influence of Kenya Association of Manufacturers on Environmental Law and Energy and Environmental Policies in Kenya

Peter Orawo

Introduction

This case study explains the way in which a civil society organization (CSO) can influence policy formulation processes. It examines the process through which the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) influenced policies on Energy, the industrialization process and the environmental law in Kenya. KAM was a partner in the policies and legislation formulation in conjunction with the Government of Kenya and other CSOs such as the Federation of Kenya Employers, international and local non-governmental organizations such as Energy for Sustainable Development, the African Centre for Technology Studies, and others.

Type and extend of the policy change

As of 1990 Kenya had a weak Energy Policy and no policy at all in the fields of industrialization processes and environmental protection. Nonetheless, Kenya became one of the first African countries to implement the outcome of the Rio Conference of 1992. It was also one of the first African countries to sign the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The political context and international factors

After independence there was not enough local expertise to manage the economy, hence the government became involved in almost all sectors. This involvement developed into serious inefficiencies. At the same time, the government was under great pressure, particularly from the World Bank, to roll-back its influence in the economy and take a regulatory role. The energy sector was of the sectors that the World Bank had in mind in its recommendations.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change/ mechanisms to get the evidence into the policy process.

As part of a move towards increased participation in the public policy process KAM and other CSOs were invited to take part in these activities. Each CSO had its own strategy to influence the policy process.

The invited institutions' representants were allowed to sit in implementation committees. Unfortunately, CSOs had no experience in this area of policy formulation. Hence, KAM approached the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) who recruited an expert in the field of industrialization, energy and environmental protection to help KAM through this process. On behalf of KAM the expert attended the appropriate committees and carried out the necessary background research and lobbying actions.

Type of evidence/research used

Desk Research on Energy Policy: It was necessary to find out what the country Energy deficit was and how this deficit was going to be influenced by the industrialization

process. It was also necessary to know the annual demand growth rate and how this would be influenced by the industrialization process and the degradation of the environment. Data was difficult to come by in the form that was useful. Various government agencies such as the Kenya Bureau of Statistics, the Ministries of Energy, Environment and Industry were approached. From the private sector, oil marketing companies, the Kenya Oil Refineries Limited, the Kenya Power and lighting Company and individual major industrial energy users such as the Cement, Paper& Pulp and Steel were also consulted.

Field Research on Energy: With instruments provided by UNIDO a field survey was conducted to understand the energy demand by region. The results of the research were presented by the expert at various workshops in which all the stakeholders, including donors and KAM members participated. KAM Board then presented the outcomes of these consultative workshops officially to various government departments and other stakeholders.

Evaluating the Advocacy Process: In the 8 years of this process, KAM members constantly evaluated the process using meetings, seminars and workshops. The workshops and seminars were well attended by KAM members and other stakeholders. Their views were constantly communicated to the decision-makers. This constant evaluation ensured that the lobbying process remained on-track. It is difficult for most CSOs to keep track for so long.

Conclusion and Overall Lessons learned

1. Though the government considers policy formulation as its prerogative, CSOs can influence policy formulation by winning their confidence.
2. Appropriate research is critical to be able to influence policy. There are instances where KAM has influenced policy formulation by lobbying alone without good research to back its demands. Unfortunately, in all such cases the policies have turned out to be less than acceptable and unimplementable. In some cases such poor policies have been counterproductive to KAM member's interests.
3. Resource mobilization is necessary for good research results. To win donors' confidence and gather the necessary resources it is important to present a well prepared proposal that answers most of their concerns. It also helps if one has worked with donors before.
4. Researchers must have a way to communicate their findings. Many CSOs do research in Kenya but for various reasons the findings never get beyond the research sphere. The researchers must be ready with briefs for lobbying purposes, say for policy makers, ministers and parliamentarians. Normally, these briefs are not identical.

Lobbying is both a science and an art. Many CSOs fail to plan the lobbying process. Though lobbying by itself alone can result in policy change it is necessary to support the lobbying process with quality.

3. From ‘Detention and Repatriation’ to ‘Salvation and administration’: A Policy Change towards the urban vagrants and mendicants in China

Xufeng Zhu

Introduction to the case

This case describes a transition of Chinese policies and practices on urban vagrants and mendicants. In 1982, China’s State Council enacted the Provisions for Detaining and Repatriating Urban Vagrants and Mendicants, in which the major administrative measures can be generalized as ‘detention and repatriation’. This policy had been in effect for 21 years by 2003. Such policy change was triggered by an incident in which Sun Zhigang, a college graduate who worked in Guangzhou (Guangdong Province), was mistaken as an urban vagrant or mendicant and sent to the local detaining and repatriating post because he was found having no means of identification in the street. Three days later, he was beaten to death by the detaining and repatriating staff during the law enforcement process.

Media coverage on Sun Zhigang’s death and the active advocacy efforts of think tank experts drew the attention of top government officials. And even though the review of constitutionality of NPC finally failed to be launched, the State Council did initiate an agenda to abolish the previous provisions. Nearly two months after the story broke the 12th executive meeting of the State Council adopted new Administrative Provisions for the Salvation of Urban Helpless Vagrants and Mendicants and they came to effect soon after.

The type and extent of policy change

The new policy stipulates that the government shall set up rescue units for urban vagrants and mendicants, and also specifies the responsibilities of unit’s administrators. According to the new policy, staff members of public security organs and other government offices involved shall instruct any urban vagabonds or beggars found to seek help from the rescue units where the government will provide accommodation and medical care services.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The political context

Since the middle and late 1990’s, Chinese people have been increasingly demanding a constitutional reform. The governance ideology of ‘administration by law’ promotes the practice of ‘administration by constitution’. This means that the government administrative organs and other administrative organizations and employees must observe the provisions and essence of the constitution when exercising administrative power and dealing with administrative affairs. At the same time there is a market driven reform that is making the government more open to advice and recommendations from civil society.

Any international factors

The criticism of Western countries, especially the U.S., against China’s human rights is a potential international factor. In this case, the Chinese government took timely measures

before the foreign public opinion has the opportunity to become an immediate cause of such policy change.

The ways Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) tried to affect policy change

When Sun's death became a hotspot in the public opinion, think tank experts seized the opportunity. Instead of submitting research reports on behalf of researchers they appealed in the name of ordinary citizens to the Standing Committee within their lawful rights, accusing the current policy of violating the constitution. This was an unprecedented move in the country and the motion itself became a center of public attention. The government was being held accountable of its own policy of 'administration by law'. More importantly, researchers and the media established a close relationship to cooperate towards the achievement of a common aim.

The nature of research-based evidence

In this case, the nature of the evidence used was highly legal analysis. Researchers focused on the legal implications of the policy while the media focused on its social aspects. The types of research include:

Researchers integrated different legal documents to prove one policy illegal.

Media reported social problems to draw the attention of public opinion and researchers.

Researchers submitted a formal appeal to NPC Standing Committee.

Researchers and Media published the content of appeal for the public.

Conclusions on what the case might tell us

This case is a successful effort by researchers and media to change an old policy. From this case study, we are cognizant of several lessons as follows:

1. The media usually serves as the first source of information exposing the problems. The media following up and reporting the development of affairs can pose pressure on the government and urge it to response rapidly.
2. None of the critiques from researchers worked before Sun Zhigang death. This was an unfortunate window of opportunity.
3. China's reform on constitutionalism has created a relatively relaxed political environment for researchers to oppugn active policy and to advocate different policy ideas.

4. Interventions of CSOs towards the First youth Policy of Pakistan

Zahid Shahab Ahmed

Introduction

This case study highlights the process and interventions by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to motivate the Government of Pakistan to develop the country's first ever youth policy. The history of the National Youth Policy (NYP) is one of steps forward and backwards. So far, four drafts of the NYP have been prepared: in 1989, 1993, 2002 and 2004. The NYP draft prepared in 1989 wasn't presented to the Cabinet, and was only issued to the press on 21 June 1989. The second draft of the NYP (1993) was prepared by a foreign consultant, but not presented to the Cabinet. The third draft was prepared in 2002, and was successfully presented to the Cabinet for its approval. It was considered by the Cabinet which suggested some changes. The current NYP draft was prepared in December 2004, and has yet to be presented to the Cabinet.

The type and extent of policy change

The key policy change came in 2001 when the government started consulting with civil society on the NYP. Between May 2001 and January 2002, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs organized consultative provincial and national workshops for the first time. In the light of these consultations, the Pakistani Ministry of Youth Affairs with the active participation of Provincial Youth Departments, CSOs and Students were able to prepare a comprehensive NYP (2002). And it is through this process that the final 2004 draft has been prepared.

Some thoughts on explanation of policy change

Political context

In Pakistan, young people have, historically, been absent from the policy debate. It was only in the late 1980s that a Youth Affairs Division was set up to look after the needs and problems of the young; resources were allocated for vocational training centers, youth hostels, and sports facilities for the youth. Between 1989 and 1999, however, Pakistan was affected by political instability –none of the appointed governments were able to complete their mandates. This relegated the NYP to a lower priority in the political agenda; and the Youth Affairs Division was reduced to be a wing of the Ministry of Minorities, Culture, Sports, Tourism and Youth Affairs. Since President Mr. Pervaiz Musharraf came to power, and during his regime (1999 onwards), the issue of NYP has surged again. And by September 2001 the Chief Executive Office directed the Ministry that a 'revised NYP be brought before the Cabinet, immediately'.

International factors

International factors have played different roles. On the one hand they have provided a framework for action (via international agreements) and, on the other hand, they have facilitated the process (via technical assistance and financial support).

Civil Society Organizations strategies for policy change

CSOs working on youth issues in Pakistan have been continuously engaged in the process of the NYP, first, by advocating the need for policy development and, later

through a consultative status with the concerned government department. Formally, these CSOs started working with the government in April 2003, when the Prime Minister directed CSOs to submit their blue prints for the Youth Force at national, provincial, district and tehsil levels.

Links between the CSOs have created a strong pressure group. Currently, there are two national youth CSO umbrella organizations in Pakistan; the All Pakistan Youth Federation (APYF) and the National Youth Council of Pakistan. It was established as a regular organization in 1987 with members from the local level. They have organized various events to raise the profile of youth issues. For instance, in 2004, APYF celebrated the International Youth Day (12th August) and invited the Education Minister Ms. Zubaida Jalal as the chief guest to the event.

Media advocacy has also been a powerful tool for CSOs. Exposures in the local media and their links with media actors have helped them to engage with the policy process. This has translated in various media publications and meetings with media actors and development experts.

Lessons

The following are considered as good practices in the process of influencing the Pakistani NYP. Some could be replicated in other countries or contexts:

1. For the NYP, the participation of the youth was essential. When policymakers cannot ensure this, CSOs can act as filters and amplifiers of the various issues concerning the youth throughout the country and forward the outcomes of their studies or consultations to the appropriate policy actors.
2. Research needs to be confronted with policy to prove its worth. Hence researchers need to submit their research findings to policymakers and relevant government agencies.
3. It is also sometimes important to publish shocking facts about the issue discussed to move policymakers into action (e.g. suicide rates among the youth).
4. Collaboration with the government is crucial to make effective interventions at the policy level. Organizing conferences with the involvement of the government and international agencies is a way of engaging with them.
5. Establishing networks among the CSOs working for the same cause can create a strong pressure group.
6. The media must become a strong ally.
7. The celebration of international events, such as International Youth Day, can offer the opportunity to invite Ministers from relevant government agencies to raise youth issues, such as education, health, poverty, unemployment etc. Other events such as book or report launches can be used as opportunities to directly inform the government by inviting relevant government officials.

A chronology of the Youth Policy formulation efforts in Pakistan: 1989-2004

Activities	Date
Youth Affairs Division is created.	12 June 1989
National Youth Policy (NYP) is hurriedly drafted and sent to the Cabinet.	18 June 1989
NYP Draft 1	21 June 1989

Youth Affairs Division redrafts NYP.	December 1990
Foreign Consultant 'Professor John Ewen' appointed to prepare NYP.	Mid 1991
Professor John Ewen prepares the NYP, and a short version of the NYP.	February 1993.
Youth Affairs Division is merged with the Women Affairs Division, and no actions are taken on the NYP.	1994-1997
Mr. Mushahid Hussain Syed, advisor to Prime Minister on Culture, Youth and Information, sets up National Task Force to prepare NYP.	3 April 1997
Mr. Sheikh Rashid Ahmed becomes Minister and directs experts, particularly from business sector, to be included in the National Task Force on NYP.	July 1997
A summary on NYP is forwarded to the Chief Executive Secretariat by National Task Force.	28 August 2000
Chief Executive Secretariat directs Ministry of Youth Affairs to revise NYP.	September 2001
Four provincial and one national consultation workshops are held to gather views to inform NYP 9(supported by UNICEF)	May 2001 and January 2002
NYP Draft 2	Mid 2002
The Congress considers the NYP and cabinet is asked to re-formulate it	23 October 2002
Ministry in collaboration with British Council and other local organizations organizes a national conference.	March 2003
In-house deliberations and meetings of Youth Ministry with CSOs and UN agencies for a funding.	July 2003 - July 2004
NYP Draft 3	October 2004

5. Grassroots Organisation Engaging Conservation Agency in Nepal: A case of indigenous fishing communities' struggle for right to fishing in South-Central Nepal

Anil Bhattarai and Sudeep Jana

Introduction to the case

The case examines the struggle of the Bote, Majhi and Musahar communities for their right to fish in a river and have access to local forest resources in South-Central Nepal. From the later part of the 1960s, the Nepali government, with assistance from international agencies (such as the United Nations) began to implement conservation policies. The Royal Chitwan National Park (RCNP) was set up particularly for the protection of one-horned rhinos whose population had significantly declined by the 1950s. These policies were based on the assumption that people were the main culprits in the destruction of wildlife and, therefore, they needed to be excluded from the conservation areas. After the introduction of these policies, their entry to the forest was severely restricted and fishing in the river made illegal. By mid-1980s, ferrying was banned across the river.

By the late eighties, however, conservation agencies were becoming aware of conflicts between local fishing communities and the RCNP. Slowly, they began to implement the concept of partnership between conservation agencies and local people through some developmental programs. But exclusionary practices continued. In fact, in December 1992, armed guards of the RCNP raided several villages lying along the river and seized all the boats, nets and most of other fishing utensils from all the houses in the villages. It was in response to this crisis that a local people's organization named Majhi, Mushahar, Bote Kalyan Sewa Samiti (MMBKSS) was set up in 1993 by the fishing communities.

The type and extent of policy change

Fishing communities now have access to Buffer Zone Management Council as a Buffer Zone User's Committee member. This committee control two major source of resources: the community forest lying within the buffer zone and a share of the revenue generated from the RCNP for the purpose of local community development activities.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The political context

The formation of people's organization and their struggles became possible because of a more open political context following the restoration of democratic rights in 1990. Before 1990, the autocratic rulers did not allow the formation of any political organization. The new constitution of 1990 in Nepal ensured citizen's fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, right to information, freedom of assembly, among others.

International factors

International conservation agencies were also beginning to realize that exclusionary policies have led to conflicts with local communities and failures in achieving conservation objectives. A new emphasis was beginning to be put on participation of local communities in conservation activities.

The nature of research-based evidence

A research centre, CDO, conducted a study on conservation policies and the practices of conservation institutions. The study focused on how local communities were dependent on local resources, and their daily interactions with the staff of RCNP. It also carried out an analysis of the impact of conservation policies and practices on the livelihoods of the fishing communities. CDO also carried out a short study on damage done by wild animals. These findings were used to highlight the fact that local communities were bearing the burden of conservation and therefore were entitled to the revenue generated by the RCNP.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change (strategy and activities)

Following the raid in their villages by armed guards of RCNP and subsequent crisis of livelihoods, village leaders, who were to form MMBKSS, began to organize themselves and discuss their rights and claims over natural resources in different villages. They also began lobbying with local political leaders for change. Dialogue with various stakeholders including political parties, local government representatives, journalists, member of parliaments and other local level institutions helped to increase public awareness on the issue.

In addition to generating knowledge, CDO also trained members of MMBKSS in techniques of non-violent action, it sponsored further studies and carried out public education interventions about community members' rights under the existing policies. CDO also took some journalists on study tour in the villages so that they could write about the livelihood crisis of the fishing communities. This generated publicity about their plight.

In the mean time, MMBKSS carried out different non violent activities to put pressure on the RCNP and generating national level debates.

Conclusions on what the case might tell us

1. This case study shows that generation of local knowledge is an essential component of local struggles for access to livelihood resources.
2. Non violent strategies and pressure tactics coupled with popular support can challenge the unjust structures and practices.
3. The struggles would not have been possible without conscious involvement of CDO in training of local activists within the MMBKSS. But research alone would not have been enough.
4. Since policies are also made at national level, it is also necessary to campaign beyond the local.

6. Local struggle towards grass root democracy: A case of Terai dalit movement for right to community forestry in Eastern Nepal

Arjun Thapaliya, Sudeep Jana and Somat Ghimire

Introduction

This case examines the grass roots struggle of a socially excluded low caste group in eastern Nepal to establish their right to the management and use of community forests. The Government brought the concept of community forestry with its realization that conservation of forest resource is not possible without popular participation and it should be linked to the livelihood of poor and marginalized groups. Community Forest Users Groups⁶ (CFUGs) thrived as institutions with empowering potentials entrusted with the rights of local management and use of forest. But due to the unjust social structure and power relations that permeate Nepali society, marginalized social groups were excluded from CFUGs.

The Saptari district located in the eastern Terai region has the highest number of dalits - low caste population in Nepal. When in 1997 139 hectares of the Bhaluwahi forest, located in the Hardiya Village Development Committee (VDC)⁷, Saptari, were handed over to the local CFUG, the dalits' livelihoods became at risk. The CFUG of the Bhaluwahi community forest consists of 182 households, the majority of which are tharus, locally powerful indigenous group. The chamars and musahars (dalit communities) are the economically, socially and politically backward minorities⁸. Hence, the leadership of the CFUG was dominated by tharus.

Fifteen chamar households had been residing on the periphery of the forest since 1990, prior to the formation of the community forest. Since 1996, there had been several attempts to inflict violence and evict chamars by the local tharus and the District Forest Office (DFO)⁹. But chamars kept resisting threats and acts of eviction. On October 2002 the high caste tharus of Bhaluwahi CFUG, with the moral support of the local police, Chief District Office and DFO destroyed chamar houses. This was possible in a time when there was state of emergency in Nepal and non-violent resistance or movements were not possible. Hence local chamars were displaced for 3 months.

Eventually, Dalit Chetana Sangam (DCS), a people's organization of dalits¹⁰, organized local Chamars, and launched a struggle for about a year against tharus. DCS' work involved thorough research into the situation of the dalits and training chamars in non-violent negotiation skills and practices. This non violent struggle changed the leadership of CFUG. Chamar habitation was restored and they gained unrestrained access to the management and use of community forest.

⁶ As of 2001, there are 847282 hectares of forest being managed by 10969 FUGs, directly benefiting 1,196,199 households

⁷ VDC is the village level government institution

⁸ More than 75 per cent of *Chamars* are landless in Terai region

⁹ District level government forest bureaucracy in Nepal

¹⁰ DSC emerged from the *Chamar* movement of 'boycotting carcass' in south eastern Nepal

The type and extent of policy change

The continued organized struggle finally restored the original habitation of local chamars and prevented future evictions. They brought changes in the leadership of local CFUG, thereafter obtaining significant impacts on the local policy and practices.

Policy changes:

- Special consideration to be given to the existing poor households while deciding the physical boundary of community forest.
- Unrestrained access of forest to poor and marginalized social groups whose livelihood is dependant on the forest.
- Information of general assembly to be disseminated one month in advance to all the members of CFUG.

It became an exemplary case and influenced dalits in CFUGs in other parts of the district to demand participation in community forests. It also improved social status and dignity of chamar in the society. The case brought significant changes in the actual practice of legal provisions concerning the participation of marginalized groups in management and use of community forest.

Conclusions on what the case might tell us

Policy context

Best practices in community forestry of Nepal coupled with democratic pro-poor policies are popular in South Asia. Policy change and institutional mechanisms are necessary conditions for participation of marginalized groups in the management and use of natural resources. But the existing social structures and relations determine to a large extent how much they could participate.

Hence, democratic policy alone does not ensure its successful practice. The dynamics of local contexts and asymmetrical power relations have important bearings upon its practice.

Evidence

Research has immense value in generating knowledge. The present case exemplifies that research based evidence if engaged in a popular dialogue and linked with the grassroots realities of people can contribute in the process of collective actions and enhancing grassroots democracy.

DCS' research highlighted issues that were not being considered by both the authorities and the dalits themselves.

In this case, research based evidence helped the dalits win the argument over the problem; while demonstrations, media and political support helped them win the argument over the solution.

Links

This case shows the significance of local struggles of right holders through alternative processes to legal actions. In this case, the dalits' movement created new spaces of engagement between them and the authorities. The synergy of research based evidence and grassroots actions helped change the prevailing discourse.

Time line of events and actions

Date	Events/Actions	Remarks
1990	Forest Development Master Plan	It became an impetus to community forestry movement in Nepal.
1993	Forest Act, 2049	CFUG as autonomous institution for management of community forests. It has a provision of the participation of poor and marginalized groups in CFUG.
1990	Beginning of 15 chamar households on the periphery of Bhaluwahi forest.	
1995	Bhaluwahi forest handed over to the community	
1995-2003	Dictatorship of Tharu leadership in CFUG	
1990	Chamars arrested by DFO	Appellate court issued a notice for eviction
1996	Tharus attempted to destroy chamar houses	Failed due to local resistance
1996-2003	Continued threats from tharus and resistance from chamars	
2002	Tharus proposed to construct a commercially viable fishing ponds on the land occupied by chamars	With the support of a local NGO but it failed due to chamar resistance and the backings of CPN (UML), CPN (Maoists)
October 2002	State of Emergency in Nepal	King dissolved the parliament
October 2002	Tharus destroyed the houses of chamars	Strong backing of DFO, District Police Office and District Administrative Office
Dec 2002	Chamars displaced for three months	
Dec 2002	Complaint lodged by chamars before District Administrative Office	Case was dissolved when DFO declared chamars as illegal settlers
Dec 2002	Case study research conducted by DCS	
Jan 2003	DCS organized right based and people's centered training	
Jan 2003	Beginning of local organizing, dialogues and mass actions	
April 2003	Formation of new CFUG committee	No representation of chamars
May, 2003	Old CFUG committed continued to dominate	New CFUG committee failed to gain legitimacy
Sept 2003	General Assembly of CFUG	Chamars' access in the leadership of CFUG

7. Introduction of Anticorruption Education in the Bulgarian Secondary Schools

Nataliya Petrova Dimitrova

Introduction to the case

The *Coalition 2000* initiative (www.anticorruption.bg) was launched in 1998 with the aim to counteract corruption in Bulgarian society through a process of co-operation among NGOs, governmental institutions and citizens. In 2003, education was identified by the *Corruption Monitoring System* of *Coalition 2000* as a corruption-susceptible area. University professors and school teachers were consistently rated by the general public in the top five most corrupt professions in Bulgaria.

Type and extent of policy change

The policy change that was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of *Coalition 2000* and its partners – governmental institutions, universities and public schools, and nongovernmental organizations and media - was the introduction of *Anticorruption* classes in the official curricula of the Bulgarian secondary schools in the fall of 2004.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The political context

Anticorruption education was a pertinent issue to work on in 2003 and 2004, since a further and more effective development of the educational reform in the country was on the agenda, including the adoption of the *Strategy for Development of the Secondary Education in Bulgaria*, which put a special emphasis on the role of civic education in Bulgarian schools. Furthermore, in the *2004-2005 Program for the Implementation of the National Anticorruption Strategy*, the Bulgarian government defined as one of its priority areas the cooperation with the civil society for the introduction of anticorruption education as a separate subject in the Bulgarian schooling system. Other local organizations and actors that worked in cooperation or parallel to *Coalition 2000*' network towards implementing anticorruption measures and legislature in the period 2003 - 2004 included: the *governmental Anticorruption Commission*, the *parliamentary Anticorruption Committee*, and the Bulgarian branch of *Transparency International*. However, most of these actors did not or could not cooperate with others and did not seek feedback about the success of the implemented anticorruption measures, nor did they publicize much their activities to the general public and business organizations.

International factors

Enhancing civic and anticorruption education in the Bulgarian schooling system was also in line with the national priorities set forth with respect to the pending accession of the country to the European Union. The year 2005 was announced as the *Year of Democratic Citizenship through Education* by the Council of Europe, therefore, anticorruption education clearly fell into the priorities of the Bulgarian Ministry of Science and Education. Other initiatives that had an impact in shaping the policy process were the *Open Government Initiative Project (OGI)*, and *major donor programs* in Bulgaria, including the Democracy commission at the US Embassy in Bulgaria, Open Society Foundation and EU Phare program.

The nature of research-based evidence

The Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) and the Media Monitoring System (MMS) of *Coalition 2000* consist of a set of quantitative and qualitative monitoring instruments that generate information about the structure and dynamics of corrupt behaviour, the scope and dynamics of corruption related attitudes, assessments and expectations of the general public, of public sector officials, and of specific social and professional groups. The corruption perception indexes produced by the CMS are produced twice per year and widely publicized in the Bulgarian media and accepted by the policy-makers and the society as a trustworthy source of information. The periodic reports and case-studies produced by MMS evaluate how the media presents specific corruption-related issues to the society. The data provided by this mechanism was successfully used to initiate and produce a specific policy change in the area of civic and anticorruption education in the secondary school system in Bulgaria.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change (strategy and activities)

Coalition 2000 and its partners applied quite a versatile and multidisciplinary approach in devising and implementing anticorruption activities. Moreover, in all those activities it sought publicity and cooperation with all the major actors in the country: members of the governmental and parliamentary committees and ministries, university professors and NGO and donor community experts became members of its Steering Committee and in almost all working groups within the *Coalition* such as: grey economy, anticorruption education, legal reform, sociological surveys, small grants, etc. To support all the governmental efforts in the area of anticorruption education, in 2003 and 2004, *Coalition 2000*, in cooperation with partner NGOs from all over the country, developed and tested a set of instruments for instruction (textbooks, on-line teaching and study materials, manuals, teaching programs), both at the university and secondary school level. These experiences demonstrated to public institutions the benefits of the introduction of such topic in the civic education curricula of the secondary and higher education systems. Furthermore, it provided evidence of action to the Ministry of Education and Science about the usefulness of new programs for anticorruption classes and ready-made teaching materials to support the introduction of such classes under the form of handbooks, electronic manuals and survey results.

Conclusions

This case demonstrates a very fruitful and mutually beneficial partnership between civil society organizations (CSOs), the private sector and governmental institutions, where CSOs stepped in to support the governmental efforts in a policy change initiative.

1. CSOs provided background information, where it was lacking or insufficient.
2. CSOs supported the governmental institutions in the design and implementation of practical tools to effect the intended policy change (e.g. pre-testing tools and methods).
3. The introduction of anticorruption education was a result of the activities and joint efforts of the broad network of *Coalition 2000's* partner NGOs. It was these partnerships that gained legitimacy and recognition by institutions and authorities and credibility among the media, general public and donor community.
4. The efforts of a broader alliance of NGOs did not go unnoticed by the donor and international community, which also recognized the *Coalition* as a successful model for public-private partnership in the fight against corruption.

8. NGOs, the extractive industries and community development: the case of NGO Labor in Peru

James Loveday Laghi and Oswaldo Molina Campodonico

Introduction to the case

This case study considers the process through which the civil society of Ilo – a city located in the southern part of Peru– guided by the developmental NGO Labor, became a real influence in the environmental attitude and corporate social responsibility of Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC), one of the main copper producers in the world. One of the high points of this story happened in 1992, when Labor and Ilo's Municipal government won a suit against SPCC in the II International Water Tribunal in Amsterdam. This event, having exposed SPCC's negative environmental impact to an international forum, was a turning point in its social responsibility behavior. Afterwards, the mining company started a coordinated plan lead by the Peruvian Government to accomplish a set of environmental standards to reduce its air and water pollution.

The type and extent of policy change

The II International Water Tribunal allowed the international community to be informed about the polluting effects produced by the mining activities of world-renowned SPCC in the city of Ilo, and its apparent apathy regarding environmental responsibility in the development of this city. As a consequence, the policy changes adopted by the mining company and the government (both central and local) since then have allowed the continuous reduction of the extractive industries' pollution located at the city of Ilo.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The policy context

Soon after Labor was founded in 1981, and when one of its associates was elected to govern the city of Ilo, this NGO and the municipality established a good relationship that lasted for almost 20 years (until 2000), based on their common objective to empower the entire town vis-à-vis SPCC. This relationship, although not free from problems, was crucial in the promotion of environmental consciousness among Ilo's citizens and the municipality itself. In this way, Labor's developmental ideas were the starting point for the elaboration of the local government public policy options.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change (strategy and activities) and impact

Labor started to seek for a global forum to present its pledges early in its campaign against SPCC. After the NGO and the municipality of Ilo took notice of the existence of the II International Water Tribunal, they decided to present the case against SPCC regarding water depletion and pollution. On December 2nd, 1991, soon after SPCC was notified (November 1991) that the Ilo's case was going to be treated at the II International Water Tribunal, the company signed the *Acuerdo de Bases* with the Peruvian State, which would be the cornerstone of SPCC compromise with the preservation of the environment in the region.

External influences

Although the II International Water Tribunal did not have judicial enforcement powers, the trial process, having received important media coverage, worked as a reputational

force that at the end helped to change SPCC's environmental attitude. The impact of this case made Shell sell their SPCC's shares due to its negative environmental attitude.

This case was also covered by a top TV program in the Netherlands and broadcasted during peak hours. It was also covered by important trade magazines in London, like Metal Bulletin and Waterlines, as well as by other media enterprises in Spain and Germany. In the Peruvian context, the trial was closely followed by the most important local newspapers, like El Comercio, Expreso and La República.

The nature of research-based evidence (content, source, reliability) and mechanisms used to get the evidence into the policy process

The evidence of air and water pollution produced by Labor's technical crew was indeed crucial to support the case of the environmental negative impact SPCC mining activities had in Ilo. Specifically, the technical studies proved that SPCC's apparently indiscriminate usage of the region's water resources was jeopardizing not only agricultural activities but the water supplies of the town itself. The findings were so clear that during this process, the mining company approached the Peruvian Government to settle its environmental liabilities via a multi-stage program designed to reduce air and water pollution in the region.

Lessons learned

The main lesson regarding this case study is how civil society can transform its welfare demands into public policy through the conjunction of interests with the local government. In this respect, this case shows the importance of adequate political leadership of the local authorities and the financial support from international agencies to protect the CSO's environmental and developmental rights, even if having to confront resource-rich, mining enterprises.

In Ilo's case, the involvement of the global civil society proved to be crucial once local instances could not deal with its environmental dilemma. In this sense, the II Water Tribunal not only helped the local community to address this issues, but its results transformed this case into a blueprint for other Peruvian communities searching to improve their environment and for the Central Government to design better public policies to deal with these problems.

9. From local action to national water policies: The experience of elaboration of the water law in Costa Rica

Jorge Mora Portugal

Introduction

This case study describes the process of participation and incidence of a civil society organization, Foundation for Urban Development (FUDEU) and other social actors in the elaboration of a new water law in Costa Rica, based on their own local experiences in the 'Grande de Tarcoles River Basin Commission'. In 2000, FUDEU's research suggested that the existing framework prevented the Commission from assuming necessary competences and legal responsibilities to be a real river basin agency. Hence FUDEU decided to promote the elaboration of a new water law in Costa Rica by creating the 'Technical Group of Water' (GTA) with other social organizations, governmental institutions and international organisms. The GTA developed the widest process of dialogue and discussion ever made around a law in this country.

Type and extent of policy change

After three years of consultation and multi stakeholder dialogues, the GTA and the Congress of Costa Rica finished a new water law project. This project was published in January 2004 and approved in April 2005 by the Environment Commission to be sent to the Plenary of the Congress. This legal instrument is expected to radically change the existing system of water management in the country, making way for the creation of River Basin Agencies.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The policy context

Over the last 50 years Costa Rica has achieved political stability. However, since the 1980s, free-market and globalization, have lead to a marked increase in poverty and internal social tensions.

Among the main policy actors, the GTA is integrated by NGOs, Universities and Research Centres, international agencies, members of public agencies and advisors of the Environmental Commission of the National Congress. This group is the main facilitator and animator of the process; although it was the NGOs and international agencies who were the GTA's main developers.

Two different sets of actors hindered the process: At the beginning some public agencies and government officers were distrustful about the elaboration of a new water law with a decentralized structure for water management, a new water administration and civil society participation. The second set of actors has been some private sector organizations, specially agriculture chambers and porcine producers that have exerted strong political and legal pressure on the process.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change (strategy and activities) and impact

To achieve a social consensus and with the aim to involve all social sectors in the process of elaboration of the water law; FUDEU facilitated workshops and meetings with local communities, NGOs, academics, politicians and social groups, to arrive at a

national consensus. This work included a series of national and regional workshops, expert panels, and formal audiences with the Environmental Commission of the National Congress. The majority of the proposals originated from all these processes were incorporated in the project of the law. This made it possible to obtain an extraordinary balance between the proposals of the different sectors, technical criteria and institutional requirements.

External influences

One of the most important characteristics of the experience of elaboration of the water law in Costa Rica, that makes it different to other similar processes in Central America, is the relative absence of influences and pressures of international and financial institutions. However, there was a favourable political environment that facilitated the interest of the government in the elaboration of a new water law, originated by the Johannesburg Summit, the Millennium Goals, and the international concerns about water resources.

The nature of research-based evidence

Since the beginning of the process in the Tarcoles River Basin, FUDEU understood the importance of having a solid base of knowledge based on two main lines: The elaboration of a strong theoretical and conceptual basis about the different elements of the water management sector and its adaptation to the Costa Rican reality. And research and analysis of successful experiences in other countries.

Lessons Learned

The process originated with the creation of the Grande de Tarcoles River basin Commission has derived in a series of very relevant lessons:

1. The process of research and learning developed around the experience of the Tárcoles (the comparative analysis of similar experiences in other countries, the constant revision of literature and documentation that experts of different countries made) highlighted the need for a policy change. Hence, the process itself was a source of evidence.
2. The conceptualization and design of the law are a direct product of the study, analysis and systematization process of the experience of the Grande de Tárcoles river basin Commission and of all the process of research and reflection that we developed around this case.
3. That situation allowed CSOs to gain credibility and being considered valid interlocutors and actors by the Congressmen and government authorities; and it has derived in a better acceptance to their visions and proposals.

10. From educational intensive care towards an educational city – the case of Araçuaí, Brazil

Mônica Mazzer Barroso

Introduction to the case

Through an innovative popular education project, the Popular Centre for Culture and Development (CPCD) - a Brazilian non-governmental organisation based in one of the country's poorest areas, the Jequitinhonha valley, has offered the municipality of Araçuaí, in the south-eastern State of Minas Gerais, the possibility of an educational revolution, in an attempt to combat the alarming statistics of the local educational standard. The 'Araçuaí: From educational intensive care towards an educational city' project was designed by an unconventional collaboration arrangement between the NGO, the local Secretary of Education and the Municipal Council of Children's Rights, where CPCD is responsible for designing and implementing local educational policies.

The type and extent of policy change

For the first time in Brazil, a local government appointed a non-governmental organisation to run its Department of Education, which entails the full design and implementation of local educational policies. Since August 2003 CPCD has been responsible for Araçuaí's Secretary of Education –even though there is not even legislation that allows a governmental body to be run by an organisation.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The political context

The good working relations between the NGO and the local government, added to the dramatic situation of the municipal educational system, and evidence that the NGO was performing much better than the local schools, led the mayor of Araçuaí, who had particularly good professional and personal relations with the organisation, to invite CDCD to implement educational policy in the municipality. The decision was made by the mayor herself, with the support from the Secretary of Education. It is important to remember that the local administration, affiliated to the Workers Party (PT), had a very popular nature, having implemented 'participatory budgeting' locally, and being open to incorporate civil society initiatives into governmental action. This is to say that the political environment was particularly favourable in Araçuaí for such a policy change.

The ways CPCD tried to affect policy change

CPCD's historical path of successful results represents a key driving force for the policy change under analysis. CPCD has been developing and implementing non-formal (i.e. outside the governmental sphere) educational projects that combine popular education and community development since 1984. Hence local governments have been ready to replicate their methodology in a number of Brazilian regions. The NGO's first project (Sementinha or 'little seed' project), aimed at 4-6 year olds, had already been employed by several municipal nurseries in Araçuaí, based on the evidence that the children who had taken part of the project were clearly better students when they entered formal education than other children who hadn't had access to the project.

The nature of research-based evidence

Evidence showed that local public primary education achieved very poor excellence rates according to research-based evaluation, widening the gap between the NGO's and the public service even more. According to the researchers involved in the gathering of the baseline data, Araçuaí's educational system had proved to be disastrous. Of the 1,684 students enrolled in 2002, 75% of the students of the 4th grade, 97% of the students of the 8th grade reached insufficient or critical performance rates, and 20% of the local population above 10 years of age were found to be illiterate.

A second source of research-based evidence that led to the policy change was CPCD's successful design and implementation of community-based educational technologies. These comparative results led the local government to involve CPCD in the process of subjecting the local educational system to an 'intensive care' process, protecting their children and adolescents from an early 'civic death'.

The mechanisms they used to get the evidence into the policy process

The main approach employed by CPCD was to highlight the local assets; rather than the region's social and economic difficulties. The project was divided into two main stages. The 'intensive care' stage involved mobilising all rural communities to look after their children and adolescents in need of improved levels of 'care'. This was done by transforming sources of local knowledge (stories, recipes, toys, practices, beliefs) into pedagogical resources. Then, the 'educational city' phase aimed at transforming each rural community of Araçuaí into a 'learning community', where local knowledge, abilities and attitudes are made available to every child, young person or adult of this micro-universe.

Conclusions and lessons learned

The Araçuaí case tells a great deal about opportunities and challenges that civil society - government collaborations entail.

1. Policy changes that incorporate small-scale successful experiences of civil society organisations depend not only on good results, but also on a favourable political context and good working relations with the policy-making sphere (it was aided by the Workers Party municipal elections victory in 2004; but has not been taken up elsewhere where the local governments have not recognised their failures);
2. Trust in local civil society organisations by policy makers can enhance their potential and promote social change more widely, enabling NGOs to reach the policy arena (CPCD's projects had already been tested successfully in municipal schools and nurseries for at least 5 years);
3. Research-based evidence can highlight local challenges and opportunities, and provide empirical arguments to support the decision-making process for constructive change.

11. Contending paradigms for contested public spaces: role of CSOs in shaping Delhi's transport policy

B. Mahesh Sarma

Introduction to the case

From the late 80s, due to industrialisation, and burgeoning vehicle population, air pollution in Delhi reached alarming proportions. The rising air pollution led to a protracted legal case, *M.C. Metha vs. Union of India*, filed by M.C. Mehta, an environmental activist lawyer. The case initially demanded the stoppage of stone crushing in the vicinity of Delhi. Even when interim judgments to the trial came from 1986 onwards by way of phasing out of more than fifteen-year-old vehicles, and the provision of hybrid fuels and bio-fuels, the state (both executive and legislature) did very little by way of policy or execution. It was only due to a sustained campaign by CSOs and threat of imprisonment for contempt of court by the judges that changes were eventually achieved. This case attempts to examine the way in which CSE was able to generate, sustain, and coordinate public opinion with respect to vehicular air pollution as the main cause of public health problems as well as playing an important role in convincing the public and judiciary that CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) constituted an ideal solution to the problem, especially in the face of strong opposing forces.

The type and extent of policy change

In the state of Delhi over a period of little under two years from 2001 to 2003 the Government of Delhi (GoD), in collaboration with the Government of India (GoI), undertook the complete conversion of Delhi's public transport fleet into CNG mode; emission norms announced by GoI were also advanced by four years for the state of Delhi; the GoI also announced a national fuel policy, formulated by an expert committee; and urban planning in Delhi's master plan came to acknowledge vehicular pollution and measures to reduce it.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The political context

A few hypotheses could be advanced about the nature and content of the change: due to the liberalisation process, quality of life issues have begun to dominate public discourse and an increasing number of internationally connected civil society organizations, powered by competing claims based on science and the use of electronic media, have been successful in exposing key issue in the public domain. Trade-offs with respect to pollution, industrialisation, development and exclusions normally would have been negotiated in the political space but are increasingly debated publicly.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change (strategy and activities)

The major strategy used by all the CSOs involved in the issue was to publish their findings in the form of reports, leaflets and press releases and use the media to sensitise the public and policy makers. Some CSOs also attempted to engage the public by way of public hearings and interactive sessions with the experts. Petitioning and corresponding with state authorities was another preferred mode of activity. Impleading themselves as interested parties in the Public Interest Litigation by way of filing interlocutory applications was yet another effective means of intervention.

The nature of research-based evidence

All CSOs involved in the transport policy debate, have used their own research based findings aided and supported by previously conducted international research findings to influence policymaking. For example, CSE commissioned a comparative study of pollution levels generated by both modes of fuels (CNG and diesel). TERI published a series of articles and reports based on its long-standing experience in energy and fuel studies about the effectiveness of ultra low sulphur diesel. Both TRIPS and the Hazards Centre advocated a larger solution of multi-model transportation with public transport at its core.

Mechanisms used to get the evidence into the policy process

Having identified the right cause (respiratory health problems), which is an emotional issue and linked it scientifically to increased pollution, CSE mounted an intensive, campaign with the publication of 'Slow Murder', a booklet highlighting the increase in deaths due to respiratory problems. This was followed by a 'signatures' campaign against diesel buses, which culminated in the submission of a public appeal to the GoD signed by leading Physicians of the country. It also co-ordinated a series of public meetings targeted at the middle classes. A series of articles in the centre's magazine and advertisements in leading newspaper as well as well articulated television appearances, led to a significant mobilization of media. CSE also ensured that its message also echoed in key government and court appointed committees thus influencing policy changes from within the state structure. CSE participated, through its leader, in the first and second committees which recommended CNG as a clean fuel.

Any international factors

All the actors involved in the CNG case used international influences or references. The World Bank comparative studies on transportation in Mexico City and Santiago as well as data and experiences from Australia helped influence the policies. CSE in particular commissioned two independent studies by international experts to examine and assert the effectiveness of CNG as a solution.

Conclusions and lessons learned

The case shows how policy making in the current context is irrevocably susceptible to public intervention. Care should however be exercised to clearly define what constitutes public, since society is constituted with people of varied class interests. Contending claims by contesting players (all of them claiming to be scientific) leads us to conclude that civil society needs to be conscious of the values, which underlie these interventions. Effective utilization of the media is crucial for the success of any public policy interventions. Judicial intervention in policy making could some times result in 'technological fix' since they normally address an immediate injustice. CSOs have a major role in educating and involving the public in what is emerging to be technology dominated risk society.

12. Advocating for pro-poor land laws: Uganda Land Alliance and the land reform process in Uganda

Emmanuel Nkurunziza

Introduction to the case

Uganda Land Alliance (ULA) is an example of a CSO that has recorded considerable success in its advocacy for pro-poor land policies, in no small measure, due to its ability to use research both to empower the poor and to engage policymakers. Aided by research-based arguments and information, ULA played a successful intermediary role, between the citizenry and the state elite, to arrive at a land law (Land Act, 1998) that is not just driven by economic imperatives but also addresses issues of equity.

Type and extent of policy change

The policy change discussed in this cases study is the enactment of the Land Act in 1998, which includes considerations that protected children, women rights, and the poor in general.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The Political context

Over the past 15 years, Uganda has been involved in wide ranging reforms aimed at rebuilding a country whose socio-economic and political fabric had been shattered by years of political instability and civil conflict. Being a predominantly agrarian economy, it was argued that to stimulate economic development, land reforms aimed at making the existing land tenure regime more efficient were crucial. Consequently, the government, in conjunction with the World Bank, commissioned a study of the existing landholding systems and their implications for agricultural development. Its findings provided a basis for drafting the Tenure and Control of Land Bill of 1990 which, however, never became law and was overtaken by events, particularly process of making of a new national constitution.

During the constitutional process, debates over land issues figured prominently and discussions on land matters were 'extremely fractious, with several competing interests advanced'. For reasons of political expediency as there were impending presidential and parliamentary elections, the provisions for land reform included in the constitution were general in nature and major changes were deferred. The constitution, promulgated in 1995, therefore enjoined the next parliament to enact a new land law. The period between 1995 and 1998 was characterised by intense debate over a newly drafted land bill, with different interest groups lobbying parliament and the President. It was during this period that Uganda Land Alliance (ULA) was formed as an interest group advocating for land policies and laws that addressed the rights of the poor and protected access to land for the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups/individuals.

The ways ULA tried to effect policy change

To achieve its objectives ULA adopted two simultaneous approaches. First, efforts were committed to raising public awareness about land issues and what was proposed in the land bill, focusing particularly on the primary groups they sought to represent – the rural poor and women. For it, ULA also lobbied key international agencies, drawing on the

connections and experiences of founder member international NGOs. The second approach adopted by the Alliance was to engage policy makers through written presentations (memoranda and research publications), workshops, live radio debates, open letters to ministers, press releases, and meetings with members of parliament and other policy makers.

The nature of research-based evidence

To support its arguments and engage with the government's proposals, ULA drew significantly on evidence provided by research either conducted in-house or commissioned. ULA relied heavily on the research capacities held by its constituent organisations to counter government proposals based on a World Bank-funded study, which recommended a tenure system aimed at stimulating the land market as a mechanism for transferring land from inefficient to efficient farmers. This demanded research based evidence that challenged the findings and recommendations of the study – the use of demographic evidence was critical. A series of publications were produced out of the research, many of which had a striking focus on gender issues.

The mechanisms used by ULA to get the evidence into the policy process

The main channels through which ULA sought to get its evidence into the policy process was through policy briefings and memoranda, highlighting the key research findings and recommendations for policy. The submissions were mainly made to parliament and government ministers. ULA also used every opportunity to engage in debate with policy makers in various forums, such as workshops and radio shows.

This approach was supplemented by lobbying international development partners who are an influential voice in the country's policy making process. Most significant, however, is the pressure mounted on policy makers by ordinary citizens as a result of sensitisation and empowerment engendered by ULA's workshops and information dissemination.

International factors

Besides coming up against vested endogenous interests, some of the proposals made by ULA did not have the support of influential international development partners who argued for market-led neo-liberal policies. However, the Alliance also managed to garner support of foreign NGOs such as Oxfam and Action Aid, who were among its initial founders, and these provided resources and support to the organisation.

Conclusion

Having started as a loose umbrella organisation, primarily constituted of international NGOs that had strong interest in pro-poor policies, ULA has grown into a strong organisation that has made significant contribution to on-going land reform in Uganda. ULA made use of research evidence not only to inform and sensitise the public on the implications of proposed land reforms but also to engage and convince the political elite involved in making policy. The case illustrates the importance of packaging research evidence in a manner that is both comprehensible and appealing to different target audiences; and civil society capacity to engage in the more sophisticated aspects of policy when interfacing with policy makers.

13. Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan - An Innovative Approach to Decrease Violence against Women

Sukhrobjon Ismoilov

Introduction

The present case study analyses the innovative approach taken by Youth Centre 'Ikbol' in collaboration with the Ministry of Defence of Uzbekistan, during 2000-2005 with the aim of decreasing domestic violence and gender inequalities towards women in Uzbekistan by using the military system to raise the awareness of men on women's rights and gender issues.

Policy Change

The case study focuses on those changes in the policy documents and practice on domestic violence which took place during 2000-2004 and continue to this date. The Ministry of Defence acknowledged domestic violence as a major problem for society and agreed to follow a series of projects to tackle its source rather than its symptoms; working on public awareness, education and introducing CSO participation into the policy process.

Some explanations for the policy change

Policy Context and International Factors

In comparison with the Soviet era, the rate of domestic violence against women is increasingly high, partly because of growing poverty, and partly because of a state-sponsored 'traditionalistic family-centred' ideology with paternalistic attitudes towards women. Such official policy makes the Uzbek Government reluctant to acknowledge that problem and publicly denounce it.

International actors have considered domestic violence as the most difficult and under-acknowledged challenge for women in Uzbekistan and called on the government to protect women from domestic violence and bring their aggressors to justice. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Human Rights Watch have all made numerous recommendations and calls on the Uzbek Government urging it prevent domestic violence against women and ensure equality of rights.

The ways CSOs tried to affect Policy change

A common strategy followed by CSOs in Uzbekistan in order to solve the domestic violence problem is creating temporary care-shelters and crisis centres for victims. While remaining a crucial tool for providing initial support and assistance to victims, such strategy does not bring about a change in policies and attitudes towards domestic violence.

The nature of research-based evidence and the mechanisms used to influence policy

Ikbol developed a new perspective on the solution of this problem. Ikbol reached the conclusion that the most effective way of fighting domestic violence in Uzbekistan would be to change the public opinion on it. Research carried out by Ikbol concluded that the

vast majority of men working in central and local governments also perceive domestic violence and discrimination against women as a 'normal' phenomenon. Based on this, Ikbol considered that an effective way of changing these attitudes, particularly among men in the public sector would be targeting military service-men in the Uzbek Armed Forces and students of military schools in Uzbekistan, through which all men between the ages of 17 and 27 had to pass.

The relation between Ikbol and the Ministry of Defence began with a meeting between Ikbol director and Mr. M. Akhmedov, the Deputy Minister of Defence on Educational Affairs, in January 2002. A long process of evidence based action and decision making followed:

1. In 2002 Ikbol and the Ministry of Defence of Uzbekistan signed an agreement of mutual cooperation
2. Between 2002 and 2004, Ikbol trained 768 military service-men and 165 students of military schools, of which 86% came from rural areas. Interestingly, this intervention also helped to decrease the level of violence, abuse and harassment within military institutions –particularly against the younger and weaker men.
3. Ikbol also trained 40 senior officers of the military schools throughout the Training of Trainers program.
4. In order to support those trainers Ikbol has published and disseminated a book on 'Domestic violence and Mitigation' among senior officers. In 2003 the Ministry made a decision to include this book into military schools' curricula and broadly disseminated it among the teachers of military schools.
5. In 2004 Ikbol was included into the Governmental Program On Educating The Youth In the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan as one of the implementers and received the first government order to design educational programs for military schools. The organisation remains as one of the implementers of the Ministry's Action Plan for 2005.

Lessons

The main conclusions this case study tells us are the following:

1. Governments are more likely to cooperate with CSOs on issues on which they more or less agree. Therefore, it is important for CSOs to construct their strategies considering the government's point of view thus creating enough incentives for cooperation.
2. Where straightforward calls on the government to launch reforms did not work it made more sense to take alternative approaches. In this case, the government was not willing to accept an approach that would openly discredit its 'traditional Uzbek family' views. On the other hand, by focusing on men's perception of human rights and non-violent conflict resolution methods (relevant for the military), they were able to engage in the process.
3. This type of side-ways policy influence process is particularly relevant in the case of authoritarian political systems because government agencies under such regimes are very monolithic and the decision and policies come only from the top.
4. This, of course, doesn't exclude the crucial advocacy and monitoring roles of CSOs.
5. Innovation and non-conventional solutions are, unfortunately, conditional of the

resources that CSOs can rely on.

14. A Policy for the Management of National Parks and Protected Areas in Jamaica

Michelle Harris

Introduction

In 1987 the National Resource Conservation Division, the main environmental management agency in Jamaica, published a report on the state of the environment. One of the issues highlighted in the report was the urgent need to implement new legislation and strengthen existing ones for more effective management of Jamaica's National Parks and Protected areas. After a long period during which series of consultations, pilots and papers were developed in November 1997, upon approval by Parliament and Cabinet, a policy for Jamaica's System of Protected Areas was defined. Based on the new policy two National Parks were established: the Blue and John Crow Mountains National Park and the Montego Bay Marine Park and management of these two parks were delegated to two NGOs.

The type and extent of policy change

The National Policy on Parks and Protected Areas was the first environmental policy in Jamaica which involved collaboration between government and non-government organisations in policy formulation and implementation. It reflected a change in policy practice and legislation regarding the approach to environmental protection and management in Jamaica. For the first time in the history of environmental policy in the country, management of the environment had been delegated to civil society.

Explanation of the Policy Change

Political Context

There are three main factors which influenced the new policy: First, after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and continuing with the enactment of the 1991 law establishing the Natural Resources Conservation Authority as the lead environmental management agency in the country, the political environment had become favourable to the idea of sustainable development, sustainable environmental management and using participatory and decentralized means. Second, as a development partner to the Government of Jamaica, USAID had already bought into the idea of decentralized approaches to environmental management and therefore their contribution to the process and support for the involvement of NGOs. Finally, the government had recognized that environmental NGOs were playing a significant role in environmental management and conservation in Jamaica, especially in the area of advocacy and public education.

The Ways Civil Society affected the policy change

Although the policy change was mainly driven by the Government, civil society had a role to play in influencing the outcome of the policy change. Their direct involvement in terms of the management of the two national parks is perhaps the most significant way in which CSOs influenced the policy process by demonstrating the principle and practice of the co-management approach to natural resource management and the value of partnerships in the environmental management.

The nature of research based evidence

Evidence for this new policy came from two sources: Firstly, in 1987 the NRCD published the Jamaican Country Environmental profile which was a report highlighting the rapid acceleration of environmental degradation in Jamaica and the need to improve environmental management systems. The second source of research based evidence came from the successful design and implementation of the USAID-GoJ funded PARC project. The philosophy of the PARC project was based on the modern concept of conservation. Therefore, acknowledged in the design of the project was the need to involve local communities and NGOS in the sustainable management of the park's resources, in addition to collecting reliable environmental data to guide the protection and sustained use of these natural resources. The pilot showed that NGOs could be good managers of environmental resources

External factors

International conferences and treaties on environment have had an effect on Jamaica's environmental narratives. For instance, the process generated by the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972 culminated in 1975 in the formation of the Natural Resources Conservation Department (NRCD) within the Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources. The 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Brazil was another milestone. Out of it came Agenda 21, a comprehensive blueprint for the global and local actions required for the transition to sustainable development. Agenda 21 help set the framework for the Jamaica National Environmental Action Plan (JANEAP). The role that USAID played as an International Development Organization in Jamaica was central in influencing the nature of the new policy, with the PARC project including the NGO component. Based on the evidence of the case it is doubtful that if this intervention were not made on the part of the USAID then the essential character of new policy would not have featured NGOs in this way.

Conclusion and lessons learnt

This case study is a good example of early attempts at collaboration between government and non-governmental organizations in environmental policy formulation and implementation in Jamaica. Some lessons learnt are:

1. Environmental NGOs can make a significant impact on the implementation of environmental protection and natural resource conservation policies.
2. Research based evidence is useful to highlight the dynamics of the participatory approach to environmental management.
3. Strategic partnerships are critical for sustainable development

15. Changing anti-crime policy through community policing in Albania

Ermal Hasimja

Introduction

This case study presents the results of a two year-long process of policy change in the field of security in Albania. The project aimed at creating a solid and legal basis for community policing in 10 Albanian regions. In 2001, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) initiated a long process of policy change which aimed to pave the road to concrete and efficient community policing, re-orienting the anti-crime oppression policy towards a crime prevention approach.

The role of local communities was considered as crucial because of the relative strength of the communitarian relations at this level. The project transformed the current security policy and new local participatory structures (Consulting Groups of Police and Community -CGPCs) were institutionalized.

Type and extent of policy change

In order to create solid basis for the policy change, IDM acted at two levels:

- The legal basis of the policy change; and
- The structuring and functioning of the cooperation in the field

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The policy Context

After the economic and political crisis of 1997, the level of criminality touched the highest levels of the post communist transition. The government was still lacking necessary resources and appropriate strategies to cope with it and civil society organizations stressed that criminality was a direct consequence of poor living conditions and also a consequence of the relative weakness of the legislative and the juridical structures. Furthermore, the state police was often accused by the opposition of either supporting the government or cooperating with criminal organizations. Possibly in response to this, the minister of Public Order and the Director of the State Police encouraged and participated in the project. The political influence of the local governments was also very important, especially since local government representatives are directly interested in issues of public order and crime fighting because their reputation depends deeply on their efforts to control them.

The main barrier to overcome was the overall public perception of the police service as a merely suppressive power under the control of the state. It was also necessary to persuade the stakeholders that this wasn't just 'one more' attempt, really meant to serve the public relations of the government.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change and impact

IDM organized local meetings with all stakeholders who agreed to meet and discuss together on the feasibility of the project and the necessary activities and their involvement. Due to the reminiscences of the past, the community representatives and

even some of the police officers were skeptic. Here, the role of the research conclusions was determinant to break-up lingering perceptions. One of the main arguments made by the research was that, even though community and police representatives were rather reluctant about the feasibility, both parts were aware of their roles in a possible cooperation. They were also shown that criminality was lower in regions with strong community organization.

Additionally, the whole process was supported with an important media campaign to raise awareness on the project and change the community's attitudes towards the police.

The nature of research-based evidence and mechanisms used to get the evidence into the policy process

The project implementation was preceded by an in-depth multidimensional research. IDM used past data on the work and results of the police service and also criminality trends and geographical distribution –employing official data. However the core of the research data was collected directly by IDM itself through detailed individual in-depth interviews with relevant police officers and local communities' representatives in the 10 regions. In the meantime, the police service agreed to install a free phone number for all citizens interested in supporting the police work at the local level; and the implementers organized several preparatory research meetings with stakeholders to enquire on their problems and feasibility of the policy change.

External influences

The European and NATO integration process is the most important political issue in Albania. Therefore the legacy of the political power is directly connected to this process. Criminality is one of the most important issues defining the efficiency of the government and the possibility of integration. European institutions, but also member countries, have supported the government in fighting crime. Italy and Greece are directly interested in this issue because of the geographic position and the possibility of criminal cross-border activities.

Lessons learned

The CGPCs are already active and the first results have encouraged other institutions to replicate the project in the rest of Albania.

Some main lessons:

1. Enquiring and understanding reluctances and beliefs of each of the parties involved in the policy change process is a key to the success.
2. The role of an intermediary organization was crucial for the project. IDM facilitated the communication between all parties.
3. The research evidence is fundamental to support arguments in creating willingness for change. Evidence is also important to convince the involved parties on the feasibility of the common action.
4. The policy change requires the largest coalition possible between stakeholders. The creation of the CGPCs was the first step in building it up. The media campaign was important to ensure public support.

16. The Power of Knowledge: CSOs and Environmental Policy Making in South Africa

Anne Roemer-Mahler

Introduction

This case study explores how two South African civil society organisations (CSOs) have used scientific evidence to influence air pollution management in one of the country's pollution hot-spots, the South Durban industrial basin. In 2000, the *South Durban Community Environmental Alliance* (SDCEA) in collaboration with a national environmental CSO, *groundWork*, launched an air monitoring project for South Durban. Their findings, which revealed high levels of benzene and 18 other pollutants in the air, triggered the establishment of South Africa's first local air quality management programme, the South Durban Multi-Point Plan (MMP).

The type and extent of policy change

Until 2005, the legislative framework governing air quality management in South Africa was the Atmospheric Air Pollution and Prevention Act (APPA) of 1965. This legislation was based on a top-down regulatory approach in which emission permits were granted without the requirement of ambient air quality assessments considering local meteorological and topographical conditions. Local authorities did not have any jurisdiction over air quality management. This changed when, in 2005, the South African government passed the Air Quality Act which, in line with the Constitution, places strong emphasis on the subsidiarity principle and encourages public participation in policy making through consultative processes.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

Political context

As a result of South Africa's apartheid-past, the government places great emphasis on the inclusion of previously politically marginalized groups in the policy making process. However, in a field like environmental policy, which is based on highly specialised knowledge and technology, the goal of broad participation is subject to the concentration of relevant knowledge and technology in one small sector of society and industry. In this sense, both government and CSOs are at a considerable disadvantage vis-à-vis industry in terms of scientifically trained human and technological resources. Additionally, enforcement is constrained by the government's dependence on economic growth and employment.

The ways CSOs tried to affect policy change (strategy and activities)

The strategy of SDCEA and *groundWork* to affect policy change consists of several components such as environmental education and capacity building in fence-line communities; the mobilisation of support through public events, the media and a network of national and international partner-CSOs; lobbying the government; engaging directly with industry; and monitoring. Monitoring represents an important aspect of mobilisation since it enables the CSOs to back their arguments with 'hard data'. This strengthens their credibility and legitimacy in a political debate which is framed largely in scientific terminology. Furthermore, the Air Quality Project plays a major role in improving the capacity and confidence of community organisations, such as SDCEA, to negotiate local

policy change with government and industry.

Nature of research based evidence (content, source, reliability)

The Air Quality project used by SDCEA in collaboration with *groundWork* is based on the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved Bucket Brigade system. A small vacuum pump draws air into a specialised clear plastic bag inside the bucket air sampler. The bag is then sealed and sent to a laboratory in the US. Here, the contents of the bag are run through a GCMS (Gas Chromatograph Mass Spectrometer), which compares the fingerprints of the sample with the fingerprints of toxic gases, such as sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides and benzene, in the computer library. As additional evidence for the health impact of pollution, SDCEA and *groundWork* monitor clinic records and ask teachers to record the health complaints of students.

Mechanisms used to get the evidence into the policy process

SDCEA and *groundWork* have pursued a range of strategies to get their air quality data into the policy process. Firstly, they have presented their findings to government authorities through both formal and informal channels. One important formal channel has been opened up by the government's emphasis on participatory environmental governance, such as the consultative processes surrounding the development of the national Air Quality Act and the Multi-Point Plan. On the informal level, SDCEA and *groundWork* have presented their data to local authorities in order to enable them to challenge data provided by the industry sector.

Before the establishment of the monitoring network as part of Durban's Multi-Point Plan, the government's main source of information about emissions was data provided by the industry sector. In this situation, the data provided by SDCEA and *groundWork* presented a valuable additional source of information for the government in negotiations with industry.

SDCEA and *groundWork* have also used their air quality data to mobilise the media, either to publicly shame individual companies or to attract attention to the general problem of pollution in South Durban.

International factors

Two main external factors have shaped the ability of SDCEA and *groundWork* to influence environmental policy through the use of scientific evidence: the link to an international network of environmental CSOs and an increasing interest on part of donor agencies in the environmental policy.

Lessons Learned

Four lessons can be learned from this case study:

1. The use of scientific evidence can be an important source of credibility and legitimacy for CSOs and thus enhance their capabilities to influence policy.
2. The validity of data is not only determined by scientific methodology but also by social representation. The policy impact of scientific evidence can be greatly diminished in a situation of political conflict where the only sources of data are the parties involved. The example of Durban's Multi-Point Plan illustrates that building state capacity to generate and verify data can provide a way out of this deadlock.
3. While access to scientific know-how can enhance the influence of CSOs on the

design of policy, their overall impact can be greatly reduced if the state is not able to enforce it.

4. International organisations, both civic and intergovernmental, can assist CSOs in building and sustaining scientific capacity by providing expertise, technology and funding.

17. Kasambahay (domestic worker) program: working together towards a Magna Carta for Filipino domestic workers

Richard G. Valenzuela

Introduction

Only a decade ago was the issue of domestic workers made public by the Visayan Forum Foundation's (VF) Kasambahay (domestic worker) Program, which pioneered the work on child domestic labour and domestic workers as a sector in the Philippines. In September 2004, with the program's continuous engagement with local government units, the local government of Quezon City, the largest of Metro Manila's cities (in population and land area), committed to facilitate the passing of a kasambahay ordinance. And, in the first ever Domestic Workers Summit in September 2005, Filipino domestic workers were recognised as the 'invisible engine' of the Philippine economy (maximising private households' productivity by freeing additional manpower into the labour market at a time when women have increasingly joined the workforce).

Type and extent of policy change

At the local level, the Quezon City government has trail-blazed the ordinance on mandatory registration of domestic workers under which they could avail of basic social services such as education, formal training, vocational training, counselling, Philippine Health insurance coverage, and arts and recreational activities. At the national level, the Philippines has enacted the Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, the Anti-Child Labor Law (R.A. 9231), and the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004.

Some thoughts on the explanation of the policy change

The Political Context

Nationally, the political atmosphere has not given a genuine attention to the issue of domestic workers. Fortunately, the Quezon City local government has heeded the call for more appropriate protection mechanisms for its domestic workers. Through a City Councillor's sponsorship, the landmark ordinance for the kasambahay registration was passed in December 2004. The Department of Labor and Employment, through the Institute for Labor Studies has since facilitated other local government units in drafting local ordinances similar to that of the Quezon City.

Equally important is the active involvement of domestic workers themselves. The VF has organised the 'Samahan at Ugnayan ng mga Manggagawang Pantahanan sa Pilipinas' (SUMAPI) or the Association and Linkage of Domestic Workers in the Philippines as the voice of the sector and the living evidence of the need for policy uptake.

The ways the NGO movement tried to affect policy change

The programme works along three components. It provides specialised crises services to domestic workers, builds the capacities of stakeholders and works in improving the working conditions of the workers through lobbying for various legal instruments at the local and national levels, using research based evidence about the current condition of child domestic workers.

The nature of research-based evidence

VF has been publishing a number of studies that document its experiences with domestic workers, especially children; publishing child workers' personal and socio-economic profiles. A recent piece of comprehensive research was the Analysis of the Situation of Filipino Domestic Workers by the ILO in 2004. The research involved a literature review of studies and surveys by both government and NGOs in the Philippines; key informant interviews; and focus group discussions and interviews with current and former domestic workers. Consistent with ILO's multi-sectoral approach, information from government agencies, NGOs, workers associations, private sector entities, and other international donors was used.

The mechanisms used to get evidence into the policy process

With VF acting as a catalyst for change, like-minded stakeholders in the government and private sector have harmoniously engaged with a number of policy-makers in the House of Representatives and the Senate to create a supportive policy environment, as demonstrated by the enactment of pertinent national laws.

VF also launched a nationwide campaign to gather a million signatures in support for the passage of Senate Bill 1772 or the Batas Kasambahay Act of 2004 during the Araw ng Kasambahay (Domestic Workers Day) Celebration in April 2005. A series of stakeholders' consultation workshops and the first National Domestic Workers Summit in September 2005 became the avenues for information gathering and dissemination. Also, with the utilisation of tri-media, advocates were able to easily expand and strengthen their existing coalition and build new policy networks.

External influences

Maximising the potential of the supportive policy climate, international donor organisations such as the ILO and international NGOs like Anti-slavery International are continuously initiating research and advocacy activities in consonance with the programme.

Conclusions and lessons learned

The following lessons learned are guideposts toward this:

1. Gathering of research-based evidence to inform policy formulation and programme development in protecting domestic workers. Comprehensive studies on domestic workers' conditions of work should be documented and disseminated in a way comprehensible to policy-makers in time for policy decisions.
2. Exploration and utilisation of the different kinds and levels of policy windows. Advocates and domestic workers alike need to influence policy-making at various levels. such as local legislation through municipal or city ordinances that could help in the passage of national legislation on domestic work.
3. Strengthening of coalitions and media links. Domestic workers, advocates, service providers in the government and private sector as well as policy-makers have to expand their reach to other stakeholders, especially those in the media who can provide an effective medium in informing the public of their cause and generating positive responses to protect the plight of Filipino domestic workers.

18. The World Commission on Dams: shaping global policy through multi-stakeholder dialogue and evidence-based research

Fabien Lefrançois

Introduction to the case

This case study will tell the story of the World Commissions on Dams, an ambitious multi-stakeholder process using evidence-based research to build a solid consensus despite the diversity of the constituencies represented. Considered good practice by many as a dialogue process aiming to shape global policy-making, the WCD produced positive results and important lessons both in terms of policy, and CSO networking and strategising for influencing policy. However due to mixed response and lack of uptake by some national governments and international institutions such as the World Bank, the jury is still out on the ultimate usefulness and replicability of the process.

Type and extent of policy change:

Various influential actors in dam-building welcomed the non-binding recommendations in the final report of the WCD, incorporating them into their own standards. A Dams and Development Unit under the auspices of UNEP is in charge of disseminating the findings. However major actors such as the World Bank and governments have rejected or only paid lip service to the report. CSOs have used it to sharpen their advocacy strategies on dam-related issues.

Some thoughts on the explanation of policy change

a) The political context

CSOs were in a strong position due to growing protests against the impact of large dams and international financial institutions on their 50th anniversary. The World Bank, whose role was being challenged, found an acceptable civil society partner in the World Conservation Union (IUCN) to initiate the WCD process. Dam industry representatives were significantly less well organised than CSOs but agreed to participate due to the growing risks and costs associated with the construction of large dams.

b) The way CSOs tried to affect change (strategies and activities)

CSOs invested energy in shaping and feeding into the process, and promoting its outcome. They used their leverage to negotiate the commission's structure, composition and workings, and secure adequate representation. Several civil society members had the implicit mandate to reflect civil society views on the 12-member commission, and a broader consultative forum used as a 'sounding-board' also included CSOs. Co-operation between those CSOs inside and outside the process benefited from existing trust between civil society campaigners. Thanks to electronic communications CSOs were able to strategise promptly and effectively, despite language issues. They participated actively in the process (commenting on drafts, submitting testimonies, leaking information to the press), publicised and promoted the final report, and used it to influence the design of specific dam projects.

c) Nature of research based-evidence, if relevant (content, source, reliability)

The WCD commissioned its own research: in-depth case studies on specific large dams, a cross-check survey of 150 large dams, thematic and country reviews, and

submissions/ regional consultations. Teams of national consultants carried out the case studies (raising neutrality issues but ensuring knowledge of the local context). They were asked to seek both quantitative and qualitative information and to reflect the point of view of all stakeholders. This was achieved for example through multi-stakeholder review meetings. The most credible and substantial studies were those carried out by researchers combining interdisciplinary expertise with perceived political neutrality. Conflicts over knowledge control sometimes erupted as governments and industry associations proved to be wary about sharing dam-related data with the WCD.

d) Mechanisms used to get the evidence into the policy process

The WCD committed early on in the process to adopt transparency and inclusiveness as the guiding principles of its work. It was crucial for the credibility of the Commission to appear to be gathering evidence in a balanced way, reflecting the perspective of the various stakeholders. Overall this proved to be successful, despite issues of resources, timeframe, language and access to communication channels.

To produce their final report Commissioners relied on the case studies, thematic reviews, dam survey and submissions/ regional consultations mentioned above. These were the four 'pillars' of a 'knowledge base' used by Commissioners to produce three thematic reports, which in turn formed the basis for the WCD's final report.

e) International factors

As this case study is about a global process, many international factors were at play: global policy making vs. national interest/sovereignty, international networking among CSOs, disparities of resources and access to policy-makers among CSOs from the North and the South, use of communications to influence policy processes, etc.

Conclusions on what the case might tell us

The WCD is a key case of global policy-making through multi-stakeholder dialogue. The main lesson is that well-organised civil society coalitions can influence policy formulation by engaging in a dialogue with official and private stakeholders, even when initial views appear to diverge strongly. Other possible lessons include:

1. Although debating a controversial issue, participants in the WCD were able to reach a substantial consensus because they felt the concerns of their implicit constituency were reflected in the process (including through evidence-gathering);
2. Consensus among participants (in that case Commissioners) does not necessarily translate into a broad consensus among the constituencies they informally represent;
3. Building a solid, evidence-based knowledge base in a way that is acceptable and credible to stakeholders involved was instrumental as a first step towards achieving a constructive dialogue;
4. While multi-stakeholder processes are an innovative way to shape policy, the non-binding nature of the WCD recommendations, key to getting a diverse range of stakeholders on board, also limited the eventual uptake, including by the World Bank who co-initiated the process;
5. Because governments are still the key actors for policy formulation and implementation, partial failure to get major, wary governments on board limited the impact of the multi-stakeholder exercise

